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DNSSEC Key Management and Exchange 
The Domain Name System (DNS) is a system that translates human-readable domain names 
into numeric IP addresses and vice versa. Public DNS server infrastructure forms a distributed 
database that contains all the domain names and corresponding IP addresses. 
 
Legitimacy of DNS has been essentially based on the trust. When a user accesses a network 
service e.g. a website using domain name, he or she trusts that the name is correctly translated 
in to IP address of the service he/she intended to access. Hackers exploiting the vulnerabilities 
of DNS protocol can gain the access to confidential information, steal passwords and private 
data. 
 
In order to authenticate DNS responses and make it more secure, a new extension to DNS 
architecture was introduced called DNSSEC (Domain Name Security Extensions). 
 
DNSSEC is a set of extensions for DNS, which includes functionality for the following steps: 
- Authentication of DNS data (check the reliability of the site) 
- Checking data integrity 
- Checking denial of existence (e.g. dummy DNS server can respond to user that the domain 
does not exist, when in fact it does). 
 
By analyzing the available technical documentation and RFC (Request for Comments) 
documents, this thesis aims to outline best practices and guidelines for DNSSEC key 
management and exchange theory. The results of this work can be used as a baseline for 
example when implementing the DNSSEC key management functionality to DNS management 
software. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
One of the key pillars of the Internet infrastructure is Domain Name System, the 
translation of numerical IP addresses to human-readable and more easily 
memorable domain names. Most of the time when resources are accessed on 
the Internet, or any other TCP/IP based network, domain names are used such 
as “www.google.com” or “www.turkuamk.fi”. Even when sending an email to 
ammattikorkeakoulu@turkuamk.fi, email clients are dealing with DNS. 
 
To provide the translation to actual numerical IP address, which is used when 
network traffic is inspected at network package level, DNS servers are 
consulted. These servers host a figurative “phonebook” containing name-
address pairs, providing the information, for example, a web browser would 
need to finally display Google’s homepage for the user who has entered the 
URL “google.com”. 
 
However, for years DNS system has been vulnerable to address spoofing. A 
“man-in-the-middle” could intercept the DNS answer and redirect the 
communication, originally meant to be directed to online bank, to the culprit’s 
own servers. To bring verification and validation to DNS communication, a 
technology called DNSSEC (short from Domain Name System Security 
Extension) was introduced. 
 
DNSSEC validation is based on a chain of trust where the DNS server higher in 
hierarchy is able to validate answers for domain below it. Each DNS record is 
associated with signature, and keys used to sign can be always validated 
starting from the DNS root. This system requires, though, that each domain 
administrative authority needs to provide the information of keys to the parent 
domain. This is called DNSSEC key exchange. For example, Finnish domains 
such as “turkuamk.fi”, “turku.fi” and “yle.fi” would need to provide details of their 
key signing keys to the “.fi” domain, which is Finland’s country code top-level 
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domain administered by Ficora ( Finnish Communications Regulatory 
Authority). Ficora is the domain name registry for “.fi” which means it has full 
authority of domains under “.fi”. 
 
This thesis is researching and implementing DNSSEC key exchange, based on 
best practices and using existing interfaces, to Nixu Software’s NameSurfer 
Suite DNS management software appliance. The planned key exchange 
mechanism will automate the key uploading for domains under the “.fi” country 
code top-level domain. Nixu Software’s DNS management products are used in 
many levels of DNS hierarchy: by registrars, ISPs, and individual organizations 
managing one or more of their own sub domains. 
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2. Domain Name System (DNS) 
 
When the Internet was originally founded in 1969 in university environment, it 
had been mainly used for educational and research needs. Because the 
networks in university campuses were relatively small, users had no problems 
with remembering numbers as addresses of the devices and destinations. 
However, during the next decade with the help of new networking technologies 
such as TCP/IP protocol, ARPANET (name of the Internet’s predecessor) 
started to expand rapidly.  
“TCP/IP made possible to connect, or inter-network, ARPA-like networks” 
(http://sixrevisions.com/resources/the-history-of-the-internet-in-a-nutshell/) 
together which caused a quick expansion of the ARPANET. Along the TCP/IP 
protocol came the Internet Protocol (IP) addresses. Using dot-decimal notion, 
an IP address consists of four decimal numbers from 0 to 255, 32 bits in length, 
resulting to over four billion unique addresses. Now each host in this quickly 
expanding network could have referable unique identifier. IP addresses and IP 
subnetting allowed building more advanced networks and network equipment, 
and whilst the IP addressing scheme was completely perfect for machines, it 
soon became quite a burden for people. Eventually it would become nearly 
impossible to remember or identify the numeric address as the number of hosts 
in the network increased. To mitigate this, the Domain Name System was 
introduced. 
The Domain Name System (DNS) is a hierarchical, distributed database. 
It stores information for mapping Internet host names to IP addresses 
and vice versa, mail routing information, and other data used by Internet 
applications. [9] 
The Domain Name System is like a phonebook of the Internet. IP addresses 
are phone numbers used by the network infrastructure itself, while the names 
associated to a number are for us humans. For example, the domain name 
“www.turku.fi” is a reference to the actual IP address “213.138.149.250” of the 
server where the city of Turku’s website is hosted. An average Internet user 
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does not ever need to know these cryptic numerical addresses in the same 
sense as most people do not need to remember each telephone number in their 
phonebook.  
It is quite clear at this point that validity of this phonebook is essential as the 
services that users access using domain names are increasingly critical, such 
as online banking services. If a con-man puts a “Bank” sign on his front door, 
some people might believe it, but most likely they will notice that this is not true; 
this bank office is fake. But online similar spoofing is much easier to disguise 
and much harder to identify as it is more common for a website to change its 
look than for a hometown’s bank building. 
To better understand how the domain name system can be spoofed a better 
understanding of the DNS working mechanism is required. In the following 
sections the DNS basics will be explained. 
As it was mentioned earlier, DNS can be represented using phonebook analogy 
- list of the names and corresponding numbers called IP addresses. But 
nowadays there are hundreds of thousands of domain names and the number 
keeps growing rapidly which makes managing the domain names a challenge. 
But hierarchical structure of the DNS makes this process simple. 
The domain names database is distributed because otherwise the file that 
contains all the names and corresponding addresses, “phonebook”, will be too 
large. The name contains few fields separated by dots “.” and read from the 
right. The top level domain is the right most field, next one to the left - second 
level domain, next one - subdomain, additional name(s) that were created 
inside the second level domain and used, for example, for organization units, 
and the leftmost field is the host name, name of the particular computer in the 
organization. 
The hierarchical structure of the DNS is shown in the figure below. 
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Figure 1. DNS hierarchical structure 
On the top of the tree, there is the root domain, also known as “.” (“dot”). 
Domains one level below are called Top Level Domains (TLD). There is a 
number of more or less generic internet TLDs such as “.edu” for education, 
“.com” for commercial use, “.net” for Internet service providers “.gov” for 
government organizations. However, as there are not any restrictions on who 
can register a subdomain under these TLDs, many of the TLDs have lost their 
original meaning. Finally, the largest group of TLDs are formed by the country-
code domains using ISO-3166-1 standardized two-letter country codes such as 
“.fi” for Finland, “.se” for Sweden etc.  
On the next level down, there are usually placed domains reserved for private 
organizations, for instance, “turkuamk” as described in Figure 1. And finally in 
this example, the domain “turkuamk” includes two subdomains called “teachers” 
and “students”. Each subdomain is delegated from the parent domain above, 
and managed independently. By using this distributed structure, administrators 
do not need to take care of millions of records in a one enormous domain name 
database, but rather they can each just manage their own organization’s 
domains. 
The above described DNS space is also known as “forward lookup zone” and 
the process of looking for an IP address associated with a name is known as 
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“forward resolution”. However, there is also “reverse lookup zone” and “reverse 
resolution” process, which is needed for searching for a name corresponding to 
an IP address. Reverse zone records contain numeric address on the first place 
and then the name of the host. Since the IP-addresses are registered together 
with the DNS domain names, search by IP-address can help to determine from 
which domain this IP-address comes. If there is no match found, then there is a 
chance that it could be a "fake." 
 
2.1 DNS process 
 
2.1.1 DNS zones and records 
 
The basic principle of the DNS is the correspondence between the numerical IP 
addresses and human-readable names. However, as stated before, DNS is a 
distributed system and, for example, for a com-domain there is not one central 
database where all these names to IP mappings are stored. There are tens of 
millions of subdomains under .com alone and administrating all the different 
organizations that have subdomains under .com domain would be extremely 
inefficient. Instead, the DNS namespace is divided for administrative purposes 
into zones. For example, IP mapping of www.nixusoftware.com name is not 
defined in the zone of .com, but there exists an explicit authority delegation from 
.com for subdomain nixusoftware.com. The Nixusoftware.com zone is hosted 
on Nixu Software’s own name servers, and the organization can independently 
administrate the nixusoftware.com namespace. Nixusoftware.com could be 
even further divided into separate zones, so that each branch office could 
independently manage their hosts, e.g., emea.nixusoftware.com, 
americas.nixusoftware.com and so on. 
Name server is the server that stores full information about the zone, precisely 
the file that contains that data. The server can be used for hosting several 
zones. For instance, two zones different from each other given in the earlier 
example, emea.nixusoftware.com and americas.nixusoftware.com, could be 
hosted on the one name server e.g., ns.nixusoftware.com. Nixu Software 
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happens to have third domain howismydns.com, completely unrelated to 
previous zones, but even this one could be hosted on the same name server. 
As long as the parent domain, in this case top-level domain .com, knows which 
name servers are authoritative for which domain, organizations can design their 
name server architecture quite freely. 
 
Zone files are created according to the specific rules and guidelines; their 
format is described in the RFC 1035 [14] (RFC - Request For Comments, a 
document, describing methods, research or innovations applicable in the 
Internet-connected systems). A simple file could look like the one below: 
 
$ORIGIN nixusoftware.com. 
@  IN SOA ns.nixusoftware.com. 
hostmaster.nixusoftware.com. (  
   2012020219 28800 7200 604800 86400 ) 
   NS ns.nixusoftware.com. 
   NS ns2.nixusoftware.com. 
www   A 200.30.20.1 
   MX 10 mail.nixusoftware.com. 
intra  A 200.30.15.3 
   MX 10 mail.nixusoftware.com. 
   TXT "Intranet web server" 
emea   NS ns1.emea.nixusoftware.com. 
    ns2.emea.nixusoftware.com. 
americas  NS ns1.americas.nixusoftware.com. 
    ns2.americas.nixusoftware.com. 
ns1.emea  A 200.50.20.40 
ns2.emea  A 200.50.20.41 
ns1.americas A 200.50.20.15 
ns2.americas A 200.50.20.16 
	  
This zone file is used to define the “nixusoftware.com” zone on the name 
server.  
Zone files contain directives and resource records. Directives are needed to 
specify tasks for the name server and to take in use zone settings. Resource 
records define the actual parameters of the zone and assign names to the hosts 
inside the zone. 
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A zone file starts with the directive $ORIGIN. This directive adds a domain 
name to non-qualified records, like the ones that have only hostname.  In the 
given example $ORIGIN is defined to be nixusoftware.com, which effects that 
the domain part can be omitted from the resource records following it. For 
instance, instead of defining the fully qualified domain name (FQDN) 
www.nixusoftware.com., just the host name part www is sufficient for the 
address record. 
 
Before the actual resource record (RR) in the zone file, there is the class of the 
record, which is in this case “IN” which stands for “Internet protocol. The class 
defines the protocol family or an instance of the protocol. Today in practice, a 
protocol is always a type of “IN” (other values are HS and CH both historic MIT 
protocols) and the whole class definition can be in most cases omitted from the 
RR description.  
 
The next type of the record, SOA (Source Of Authority), defines the DNS zone. 
Ns.nixusoftware.com is the name of the primary name server, which is the 
server storing the master zone file. hosmaster.nixusoftware.com is the domain 
administrator’s email address, where the “@” sign of the email address is 
replaced with a dot. 
 
The SOA record section in round braces contains the parameters which are 
needed for correct communication with other name servers. The first number, 
“2012020219” in this case, is called Serial and represents the version of the 
zone. Every time when any modification has been made in the zone file, this 
number is increased. When the secondary name server refreshes the data and 
notices that the number in its cache is smaller, it requests a new copy of the 
zone with recent changes.  The next number, “28800” represents Refresh 
interval in seconds and tells to secondary servers how often the primary server 
should be checked for updates. If the primary server does not reply, “Retry” 
interval (“7200” seconds) specifies the time between communication attempts. 
The parameter  “Expire” (“604800”) tells to secondary servers for how long they 
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should serve the domain if the primary server does not respond to queries. 
Finally, the last one, “Minimum” sets the default time-to-live (TTL) for the 
records in the zone. TTL defines the maximum time the secondary server 
should keep the individual record in cache without refreshing it from the primary 
server. 
 
NS records after parameters describe name servers serving the zone (NS 
stands for Name Server). In the given example, the names of the servers are 
ns.nixusoftware.com and ns2.nixusoftware.com. It is a good practice to have at 
least two name servers for the zone to ensure high availability of the zone data. 
Servers can be even split to different geographical locations to ensure low 
latencies globally. 
 
The next section in the zone file is filled with the A records. Here comes again 
the “phonebook” analog, because as the record in the phonebook, address 
record (A) consists of a computer’s name and its IP address. “A” records 
provide human-readable names to numeric IP address translation. In the given 
example, the string “www   A   200.30.20.1” means that the machine with the 
name “www” has IP address 200.30.20.1 in the network. 
 
In the example zone, www, intra, emea, americas are all called nodes. Each 
node can have one or several resource records. For example, node “intra” has 
three: 
intra  A 200.30.15.3 
   MX 10 mail.nixusoftware.com. 
   TXT "Intranet web server" 
 
The first is the A record, that specifies IP address of the computer; the second 
is an MX (mail exchange) record that specifies the mail server responsible for 
emails in the given zone; finally, there is a TXT (text) record that can contain 
comments about the node. 
 
10 
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 In the last section of the example there are again two NS records. But 
these records are used for the delegation. Like in the context of the SOA 
record where there were NS records defining which servers were 
authoritative for this particular zone (ns.nixusoftware.com and 
ns2.nixusoftware.com), also here it means that sub-domain 
“emea.nixusoftware.com” is managed and stored on name servers 
ns1.emea.nixusoftware.com and ns2.emea.nixusoftware.com. So 
whatever belongs to subdomains emea and americas are no longer this 
zone file’s or even this name server’s concern. The only exceptions are 
the last four lines of the zone, A records specifying the IP addresses for 
these external name servers. These records are often called glue 
records. These records exist to prevent an endless loop situation where 
name server replies that ns1.emea.nixusoftware.com is the authoritative 
server for zone emea.nixusoftware.com, and once a DNS client asks for 
ns1’s IP address, again it receives the same response from the server 
that ns1.emea.nixusoftware.com is authoritative for zone 
emea.nixusoftware.com. 
 
There are over 20 RRs specified by the RFC and the ones mentioned in the 
example are some of the most common ones. A few more DNSSEC specific 
RRs will be introduced in the upcoming sections. 
 
2.1.2 DNS name resolution process. 
 
The hierarchical structure of DNS allows that any given DNS record can be 
resolved starting from one point, the root node “.”. The chart below describes 
the exact steps in the DNS name resolution process. 
11 
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Figure 2. DNS name resolution process 
In the given example, the local recursive DNS server responds to a query for 
“foo.example.com” domain. First, the DNS server checks its local cache and 
tries to find any matches stored based on previous similar queries. If there are 
no such entries and thus server cannot resolve the name, it will look up for 
another DNS server, starting from the root’s authoritative DNS server. The root 
server’s response contains information about the server, which is authoritative 
for “.com” zone. After the next iteration, the IP address of “example.com” 
domain’s authoritative DNS server is obtained. Finally, the “example.com” 
authoritative DNS server replies with the IP address of “foo.example.com” entry 
and the recursive server delivers the result to resolver. In addition, the recursive 
DNS server updates its cache with the new entry and stores it for a predefined 
amount of time. In the future if a client requests the same data, it will be 
provided with a reply from the server’s cache thus speeding up the resolving 
process considerably. 
As a result of the described process, the user receives the web page he/she 
was interested in. However, there are some weak points.  
12 
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Figure 3. "DNS spoofing" / "DNS cache poisoning" attack technique 
Figure above displays one of the most common hacker techniques, called “DNS 
Spoofing / DNS cache poisoning”. When a client is trying to obtain the address 
of the requested site, the attacker replaces the real one with the counterfeit. As 
the result, the user will be redirected to the bogus web site without noticing the 
difference and might leave there important information that can be stolen by 
malefactors. Moreover, wrong data will be stored in the recursive DNS server’s 
cache and each user who requested the same site would be redirected to the 
false one. Usually this type of attack cannot be detected immediately and it 
might take some time to liquidate it.  
Imagine that a customer would like to visit a bank office and check his/her bank 
account. In real life, it is not that easy to imitate a branch office. If someone puts 
a “Bank” sign on the barn door, it is most likely that bank customers will notice 
that something is wrong. Today there are fewer reasons to go to physical bank 
office; every day finances can be controlled via online banking just by typing 
“www.bank.com” in the web browser. Next the operating system’s resolver asks 
from the one of the known DNS servers about the IP address of the requested 
13 
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web site. But neither user nor web browser can verify that received data points 
to the real web site of the bank, which is located in “bank.com” domain. There is 
a chance that DNS-answer was falsified on one of the steps of the resolving 
process. The main threat in this situation is that the received IP address could 
point to the phisher’s server where the fake bank web site is located. This site 
can look exactly as the real one and even address in the browser’s address line 
could be the same. As a result, an innocent user without any uncertainty will 
provide all the needed bank login authentication information that will be used by 
criminals. 
Even though DNS was invented in 1983, only in the1990s Internet providers 
started to talk about ways to be able to validate the DNS information and 
describe the first edition of DNSSEC - Domain Name Security Extensions. 
 
2.2 DNSSEC 
  
Initially DNS had no data securing mechanism against falsified information. In 
order to protect the information from cache poisoning and “man-in-the-middle” 
attacks, DNSSEC (Domain Name System Security Extensions) was designed. 
The main purpose of DNSSEC is to validate the authenticity and integrity of the 
DNS data.  
 
The idea of DNSSEC is that every DNS response can be verified by the client 
with the digital signature. DNS zone data consists of resource records (RR) and 
when a client requests DNS data, it means that the client is looking for 
appropriate RR. The purpose of DNSSEC is to assure that the requested RR 
really exist or not and they have not been modified during the DNS resolution 
process. This is achieved by using digital signing - when DNSSEC is enabled, 
every Resource Record is signed with the unique secret key and carries a 
digital signature. 
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DNSSEC DNS data signing relies on asymmetric cryptographic algorithm. This 
means that for encrypting and decrypting data two keys are required – a private 
to encrypt the message to be sent and a public to decrypt the received 
message. These keys form a key pair (two keys generated at the same time 
using same algorithm); data encrypted with the private key can be decrypted 
only with the corresponding public one. By using this authentication 
mechanism, a user in possession of the public key can be sure that the data 
he/she received is originated from the trusted source (or at least from the same 
source as the public key) and has not been changed during the transmission 
process. 
 
A DNSSEC key can be either a Zone Signing Key(ZSK) used to sign all 
resource record sets in a zone, or a Key Signing Key(KSK) used only to sign 
the set of keys that is used to sign the zone. The reason why there are two 
different keys is to define a separate set of functions due to minimize the 
complexity of the tasks associated with the key update processes and zone re-
signing. 
  
KSK is used to sign a set of keys (i.e., a set of DNSKEY resource records) and 
this is the key that is passed to the parent zone for authenticated delegation. It 
can also be used as a trusted anchor for establishing a trusted chain for 
signature verification. 
 
The ZSK is used to sign the all the sets of resource records in the zone. The 
public zone signing key (ZSK-public) is stored in the zone and so is publicly 
available. 
 
From the DNS perspective, the process looks like this: administrator of the 
zone, for example “nixusoftware.com”, by using the secret key signs the zone 
data so that each RR will have its own digital signature. When a DNSSEC-
enabled client requests for an RR from the authoritative DNS server, this 
signature will be received together with the RR in server’s reply. The zone’s 
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corresponding public key for encryption can be stored in some publicly available 
place, so every user can utilize it to validate the received data from the 
“nixusoftware.com” name server.  
 
However, so far the above example has not solved the “trust” problem. If 
hackers can counterfeit DNS responses, they can also create fake key pairs 
that are required for data authentication and replace real ones with them. There 
needs to be a way to validate also the public key itself. To resolve this problem 
DNSSEC includes additional security mechanisms - digital signatures give a 
possibility to build “chain of trust” so that the public key used to authenticate 
signed data, can be verified by someone else higher up in the DNS chain. In 
practice, this means that, for example, information about Key Signing Keys of 
zones nixu.com, nixusoftware.com and example.com could be all stored in .com 
nameservers, therefore, becoming a “trust anchor” for domains below “.сom”. 
Nameserver administrators would only then need to configure one “trust 
anchor” instead of one for each somethingsomething.com domain. 
 
Using this technique, the most optimal trust anchor would be, of course, the 
DNS root zone “.” where all the delegations begin. “July 15, 2010: ICANN 
publishes the root zone trust anchor and root operators begin to serve the 
signed root zone with actual keys – The signed root zone is available.” 
(http://www.root-dnssec.org/) Figure 4 below displays the public key of DNS 
root that can be used for such purposes.  
 
	  
Figure 4. Publicly available DNS root public key (trust anchor) 
 (https://dnssec.surfnet.nl/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/signed-statement-rori.txt) 
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2.2.1 The DNSSEC Resource Records and zone file format. 
 
In the DNSSEC each signed zone has a key pair associated with it - private for 
encrypting and public for decrypting. As the zone is signed, a new set of RRs 
are added in the zone file - DNS Public Key (DNSKEY), Resource Record 
Signature (RRSIG), Next Secure (NSEC) and Delegation Signer (DS) [16].  
 
DNSKEY Resource record 
 
The public keys are stored in DNSKEY resource records and are used in 
the DNSSEC authentication process: a zone signs its authoritative 
RRsets by using a private key and stores the corresponding public key in 
a DNSKEY RR.  A resolver can then use the public key to validate 
signatures covering the RRsets in the zone, and thus to authenticate 
them. [16] 
 
The DNSKEY record looks like the example below: 
example.com. 86400 IN DNSKEY 256 3 10 
Av855BgBuhYcK+BF1l6lUPnppX8fupRPjiJA17kB5j0fXbirPqEuuP
wXRYJCpZu2YHRqt3GXLvmurDfoWgIjsdCTjhduTxXJMQGUS7nOAoQR
QsibykOVLCLE23oA9Oj5Pt2gda4a6KZOBYqk4VVBH725t2PfKX2lQx
xWtCJhRW4P9QM= 
 
The first field, domain’s name (“example.com” in given example), specifies the 
owner of the public key. Next three fields specify TTL (Time-to -live), class and 
type of the Resource Record. 
 
The following fields provide more information about the key itself. “Value 256 
indicates that the Zone Key bit (bit 7) in the Flags field has value 1 “ [16], which 
means that record contains zone signing key. “If bit 7 has value 0, then the 
DNSKEY record holds some other type of DNS public key and MUST NOT be 
used to verify RRSIGs that cover RRsets.” [16].  
 
Value “3” represents the Protocol and this value is fixed.  
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The Protocol Field MUST have value 3, and the DNSKEY RR MUST be 
treated as invalid during signature verification if it is found to be some 
value other than 3. [16]. 
 
Value “10” represents the algorithm type that was used for generating the key. 
In the given example, it is RSA/SHA-512. A list of possible algorithms can be 
found in RFC 4034, Appendix A.1 “DNSSEC Algorithm Types”.  
 
Finally, there is a Public Key field which stores the Public Key itself. This key 
can be used to verify rest of the zone’s resource record signatures. 
 
RRSIG Resource Record 
 
RRSIG (Resource Record Signature) is a digital signature and contains related 
information - time interval of validity of the signature, algorithm used, the name 
of the signer and the key tag to identify the DNSKEY RR.  A correctly signed 
zone has a RRSIG record for each resource record in the zone. 
 
Assuming that in the zone “example.com” there is a host with following name 
and IP address: 
host1   A 200.30.15.3 
 
Then, corresponding RRSIG record wil look like this: 
RRSIG A 10 3 86400 20120316000000 20120214120107 
24515 example.com 
0l7sawlQPJhGpSxTo8I4NbM495xv/zrEDcOus2tmsLcSoObMmNM5/s
c+Av5enSMnJNLVMyDHJKBs/kPwiqqxUeV+AuEdxCvMGvOUvWXawfFK
YF7c3eZGTxAg1Ae1MpuJAmKptHHqv7ck1R2hLYRR5EW0uCiTnBScoe
osXbXqJpY= 
 
Letter “A” represent the type of RR that is signed with this particular RRSIG. 
Value “10” represents the algorithm type. Value “3” is the number of Labels 
(number of RRs that is needed for checking owner’s name. Since Root has 
Label = 0, 1st Level TLD =1 and so on). For example, “www.nixusoftware.com” 
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has 3 labels, meaning that value in the Label field will be “3” and for 
“nixusoftware.com” the value will be “2”.  Number “86400” is TTL (Time-to live) 
value of the original record (RR that was signed).  
Values “20120316000000” and “20120214120107” represent Signature 
Expiration and Signature Inception (when the signature was published in the 
zone), which define the period of validity of this particular RRSIG record. The 
format of these values is “YearMonthDayHoursMinutesSeconds”. 
 
The next field with value “24515” is the key tag; “example.com” is the name of 
the signer (name of the zone). 
  
The last field is the signature itself which can be validated using the 
corresponding zone signing key. 
 
NSEC Resource Record 
 
The two previously described DNSSEC Records are used to verify the received 
data. But in case the user requests some record from the DNS server and such 
record does not exist, server will return an empty answer. And this answer could 
not be signed because it does not contain any Resource Record. 
 
The NSEC (Next Secured) resource record is required to verify denial of 
existence. In the previously given example zone “example.com” there are two 
records - one for “host.example.com” and another one for “host2.example.com”. 
If someone is requesting the record “host1.example.com”, the server will return 
a reply with the NSEC record, saying that the next secured record after 
“host.example.com” is “host2.example.com” and record “host1.example.com” 
does not exist. 
 
NSEC record for the “host.example.com”: 
host   A 200.30.20.1 
 
NSEC host2.example.com A MX RRSIG NSEC 
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NSEC record for the “host2.example.com”: 
host2   A 200.30.15.3 
 
NSEC example.com A MX TXT RRSIG NSEC 
 
The first field specifies the RR type(NSEC). The next entry represents the next 
authoritative name. The following fields (A, MX, RRSIG, NSEC for first example) 
indicate the RRs associated with the name, meaning that for name 
“host.example.com” only those records exist. 
 
DS Resource Record 
 
To be able to build the “chain of trust”, or, in other words, to interconnect signed 
domains, the “Delegation Signer” resource record is used. 
 
The DS record stores the hash of the Key Signing Key public part and by this 
refers to a DNSKEY resource record. This record is usually placed in the 
delegation section in the parent’s zone file together with corresponding NS 
record defining which servers are authoritative for the child zone. In addition, 
the DS record indicates that the zone is signed.  
 
After signing the zone with ZSK and KSK, the zone administrator needs to 
generate the DS record and send it to the parent zone administrator. Usually at 
the receiving end, there is a domain registrar, and most of the registrars provide 
a special secured web interface the DS record uploading, e.g., in case of 
GoDaddy, one of the largest .com registrars. 
 
The DS Resource Record refers to a DNSKEY RR and is used in the 
DNS DNSKEY authentication process.  A DS RR refers to a DNSKEY 
RR by storing the key tag, algorithm number, and a digest of the 
DNSKEY RR. Note that while the digest should be sufficient to identify 
the public key, storing the key tag and key algorithm helps make the 
identification process more efficient.  By authenticating the DS record, a 
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resolver can authenticate the DNSKEY RR to which the DS record 
points.   
 
   The DS Resource Record and its corresponding DNSKEY Resource 
Record have the same owner name, but they are stored in different 
locations.  The DS RR appears only on the upper (parental) side of a 
delegation, and is authoritative data in the parent zone.  For example, 
the DS RR for "example.com" is stored in the "com" zone (the parent 
zone) rather than in the 
"example.com" zone (the child zone).  The corresponding DNSKEY RR 
is stored in the "example.com" zone (the child zone).  This simplifies 
DNS zone management and zone signing but introduces special 
response processing requirements for the DS RR. [16] 
 
2.2.2 DNSSEC process 
 
The previous examples in the “DNS” chapter described the DNS name 
resolution process and possible vulnerabilities in the DNS system. But how 
would the system work with DNSSEC enabled? Figure 5 will help to understand 
this process. 
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Figure 5. DNS name resolution process with DNSSEC 
Assume that the user is requesting for the same “foo.example.com” domain as 
in the previously given examples.  
1. Requesting domain name from recursive DNS server. 
 
2. The recursive DNS server adds the bit “DO” (“DNSSEC OK”) to the request 
indicating that the resolver is able to accept DNSSEC security Resource 
Records and requests A record for “foo.example.com” from the root server. 
 
3. The recursive DNS server knows that the domain root is signed by having a 
pre-configured “trust-anchor”, which could be either the domain root’s public 
key or the key's corresponding DS resource record. Using the trust-anchor, 
the recursive server requests DNSKEY records for the root zone and 
compares the answer with the stored records.  
 
4. Root server does not know neither the requested A record or the domain 
name, but knows where zone "com" is hosted. The server provides the 
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recursive server with “com” authoritative name server’s addresses together 
with the signed “Delegation Signer” record for the "com" zone.  
The DS record is inserted at a zone cut (i.e., a delegation point) to 
indicate that the delegated zone is digitally signed and that the delegated 
zone recognizes the indicated key as a valid zone key for the delegated 
zone. [15] 
 
5. The recursive DNS server validates the “DS” record with the trusted root 
zone's ZSK (Zone Signing Key). 
 
6. At this point, the recursive DNS server knows that the zone is signed and 
requests DNSKEY from the zone's DNS server. After key validation, the DNS 
server asks “com” server about "foo.example.com". However, "com" zone's 
authoritative server does not know about it, but knows that zone 
"example.com" hosted on name servers "ns.example.com" and 
"ns1.example.com". So the DNS server replies to the recursive DNS server 
with this data and again with the corresponding DS record. 
 
7. Now the recursive DNS server has built a chain of trust to "example.com", 
where it will obtain addresses of name servers of "foo.example.com" and its 
“DS” records. 
 
8. Finally, the recursive DNS server iteratively gets addresses of DNS servers 
responsible for "foo.example.com". It sends a request to those servers, 
receives the answer, validates information and provides an address record 
with “AD” (“Authenticated Data” [17]) bit in the response. 
 
9. If there is no possibility to validate data, for instance, the DNS domain has 
DNSSEC broken, or the DS records do not match the corresponding keys, 
the resolver will return the error message “servfail”. 
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The process of the name resolution with DNSSEC enabled does not have any 
big difference from the process without it. Nowadays there are various utilities 
which can be used to automatically create digital signatures and sign the zones. 
However, it is not enough to sign the zone just once - for instance, as it was 
shown on the example because the RRSIG record has its period of validity. 
This means that the zone’s administrator should periodically re-sign the zone 
with newly created signatures to prevent brute-force attacks, which is a type of 
attack where attacker is trying to find out the original private key used to sign 
the zone, by checking all the possible key combinations until the correct one is 
found. 
 
For various reasons, keys in DNSSEC need to be changed once in a 
while.  The longer a key is in use, the greater the probability that it will 
have been compromised through carelessness, accident, espionage, or 
cryptanalysis.  Furthermore, when key rollovers are too rare an event, 
they will not become part of the operational habit and there is risk that 
nobody on-site will remember the procedure for rollover when the need is 
there. [6] 
DNSSEC Key Management mechanisms will be explained in details in the next 
sections. 
 
2.3 DNSSEC key management. 
 
In the previous sections, the theory of DNSSEC was studied, including general 
principles and working mechanisms. In this section actual processes involved 
into DNS zone signing steps and DNSSEC data management will be discussed. 
 
2.3.1 Algorithm choice 
 
The very first step in the zone signing process is to choose the algorithm for 
generating the keys. The algorithm choice is based on the recommendations 
given in RFC 4641: 
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There are currently three different types of algorithms that can be used in 
DNSSEC: RSA, DSA, and elliptic curve cryptography.  The latter is fairly 
new and has yet to be standardized for usage in DNSSEC. 
 
RSA has been developed in an open and transparent manner.  As the 
patent on RSA expired in 2000, its use is now also free. 
 
DSA has been developed by the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST). The creation of signatures takes roughly the same 
time as with RSA, but is 10 to 40 times slower for verification [17]. 
 
We suggest the use of RSA/SHA-1 as the preferred algorithm for the 
key. The current known attacks on RSA can be defeated by making the 
key longer. As the MD5 hashing algorithm is showing cracks, we 
recommend the usage of SHA-1. [6]. 
 
Almost every name server that supports DNSSEC includes the tool for key 
generating. The most common DNS software is the BIND server whose latest 
versions includes command-line utility called “dnssec-keygen” that can be used 
to generate the DNSSEC key pair (private key and public) as defined in RFC 
2535 and RFC 4034. This tool allows the administrator to choose the algorithm. 
 
2.3.2 Key length and lifetime 
 
Since there are two key types used in DNSSEC, Zone Signing Key and Key 
Signing Key, different parameters should be considered when creating the key 
pair. According to RFC 4641:  
zone administrators will need to take into account how long a key will be 
used, how much data will be signed during the key publication 
period...and, optionally, how large the key size of the parent is [6]. 
 
Selected key length is determined by the ratio between the risk of key 
compromise and performance. Performance is determined by the time of 
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signature creation and signature verification. The packet length of DNS-
response must also be considered, because DNSKEY resource records are 
sent in an additional section of the DNS-response.  
 
Since the KSK is only used for signing sets of keys (a set of DNSKEY resource 
records) the performance is not a deciding factor. However, a compromised 
KSK can have a greater negative impact, because the key is actually a master 
key for the zone. The key compromise higher in the DNS-hierarchy can put 
most of the DNS-sub tree under spoofing attacks. Thus, KSK recommended 
that the key length is large: it has little impact on performance, but is 
susceptible to compromise. 
 
When the administrator selects a key length for the ZSK, performance is a 
major factor, because the key used to sign all the sets of resource records in 
the zone. In terms of the impact of compromise, the compromise is limited only 
to the zone, because ZSK is not used to provide authenticated delegation to the 
parent zone. Consequently, the ZSK may be shorter than the KSK. 
 
The selected usage period (rollover interval) is determined by the risk of a key. 
In the case of KSK, the amount of information being signed is not very large 
because the KSK signs only the DNSKEY resource records. This in 
combination with a large key length leads to the fact that the rollover interval of 
KSK can be long e.g., up to a year. 
 
In the case of ZSK key, the risk is higher. ZSK is used to sign rest of the zones 
RR sets and it usually has a relatively small key length. These lead to the fact 
that the period of validity for ZSK keys must be less than the period of validity of 
KSK, which is usually one or two months. 
 
It is very important to remember that the keys were created with a certain 
lifetime. Once signatures expire, data cannot be validated anymore and will be 
marked as “invalid” so clients cannot use it. That is why it would be useful to 
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have this process automated - administrators can receive alerts when the key’s 
expiration date is coming and re-signing is needed. 
 
2.3.3 Key rollover 
 
DNSSEC public keys should be changed periodically, and the more frequently 
the keys are regenerated, the more difficult it is to reverse-engineer the 
matching private key. That is why it is very important to have a plan not only for 
DNSSEC key generation, but also for key rollover. As written in RFC 4641, the 
document describing DNSSEC operational practices: 
 The longer a key is in use, the greater the probability that it will have 
been compromised through carelessness, accident, espionage, or 
cryptanalysis. [6] 
 
In RFCs, recommendations for key effectiveness period are given based on the 
key type.  
... a reasonable key effectiveness period for Key Signing Keys is 13 
months, with the intent to replace them after 12 months.  An intended 
key effectiveness period of a month is reasonable for Zone Signing Keys. 
[6]  
However, it is not recommended to strictly follow this advice and have a 
predictable schedule for keys rollover due to security reason. Another document 
called “Five Strategies for Flawless DNSSEC Key Management and Rollover” 
suggests that  
instead of rolling the ZSK every 90 days like clockwork, you could pick a 
time within a 10-day window on either side of the otherwise predictable 
quarterly rollover date. [13] 
 
The standard practice to rollover the keys are in staged manner, which means 
“to generate a new key pair, and then have the two public keys coexist at the 
publication point for a period of time.” [2] Using this practice will give the clients 
and relying parties a time interval to obtain the upcoming key. During this 
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period, both keys, the old and the new one, will be used for validation and after 
the old key has expired it can be removed and only the new one will stay in use. 
 
Resolvers that are using DNSSEC should refresh their local cache of 
zone keys in synchronization with a published schedule of key rollover, 
and ensure that they load a copy of the new key within the period when 
the two keys coexist. In this way when the old key is deprecated, 
responses from the zone servers can be locally validated using the new 
key. [2] 
 
2.3.4 ZSK (Zone Signing Key) Rollover. 
 
As stated earlier, zone signing key (ZSK) should be rolled over more often than 
key signing key (KSK). The most important reasons for that are the fact that 
zone signing key is usually much shorter than key signing key and the roll-over 
of zone signing key has smaller impact on DNS hierarchy:  
During a ZSK rollover, all changes are local to the zone that renews its 
key: there is no need to contact other zones administrators to propagate 
the performed changes because a ZSK has no associated DS record in 
the parent zone. [5] 
 
ZSK is used to sign zone’s resource records and the signatures made with it are 
included in every DNS response. Because of that, ZSK needs to be short; 
otherwise networks and DNS servers will need to deal with a large amount of 
data. However, it can be compromised more easily, that is why it is 
recommended to change this key often, once in 90 days as it was mentioned in 
previous section. 
 
RFC 4641 proposes two methods for the zone signing key (ZSK) rollover: pre-
publish method and the double signature method.  
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When the pre-publish method is used, new zone keys are created and 
published in the zone in advance but these are not used for signing yet. The 
new key is added to the zone’s key set and the key set’s signatures are 
regenerated with key signing key. This “advance” period of time is  
the time that it takes for zone data from the previous version of the zone 
to expire from old caches, i.e., the time it takes for this zone to propagate 
to all authoritative servers plus the Maximum Zone TTL value of any of 
the data in the previous version of the zone. [6]  
 
This means that the administrator should consider the “Refresh Time” and 
“Minimum TTL” values defined in the zone’s SOA record. If, for example, the 
common default value of 3600 seconds is used, the keys should be published in 
the zone in 2 hours before the actual key rollover.  
 
The second stage in this method is to remove old signatures and generate new 
with new keys. At this point, the old key still remains in the zone file’s key set in 
case that some name servers are still caching the old signatures and have not 
yet fetched the new zone data. This ensures that even those servers are able to 
validate the signatures. The duration of this stage could be  
 i.e., the time it takes for this zone to propagate to all authoritative 
servers plus the Maximum Zone TTL value of any of the data in the 
previous version of the zone. [6]. 
 
In the final stage, the old key can be removed for the key set completely. At this 
point, the zone file contains only the new key and new RRSIG records. In 
addition, usually at the final stage, the upcoming zone signing key could be 
introduced to the key set. Finally, the key set is re-signed with the key signing 
key. 
 
If the double signature method is used, new signatures are generated together 
with the introduction of the new key, and will happen before the old signatures 
are removed from the zone data. So there is a period of time when the 
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signatures of current key and also the signatures of the upcoming key are 
coexist. This period lasts usually two times the current maximum zone TTL (the 
“Expire” value in zone SOA record) before the end of validity of the old keys. 
Both the old signatures and the old key will be removed one zone TTL prior to 
the expiry. Thus, there will be only one set of signatures created by a key in a 
single rollover chain at a time when using the pre-publish mode because the 
signatures that are about to expire will be removed simultaneously as the new 
signatures are added. 
 
2.3.5 KSK (Key Signing Key) Rollover 
 
Key Signing Key (KSK) does not need to be rolled over as often as the ZSK. 
This type of key is used for signing relatively small amount of data and the key 
can be longer that ZSK. Longer keys are not that easy to compromise, so KSK 
can be normally rolled over once in a year. 
 
Note that KSK rollovers and ZSK rollovers are different in the sense that 
a KSK rollover requires interaction with the parent (and possibly 
replacing of trust anchors) and the ensuing delay while waiting for it. [6]  
 
For the KSK rollover, the same principles can be applied as with ZSK rollover. 
The recommended rollover method is the double signature method. In KSK’s 
case, the double amount of signatures is not much of an issue as the amount of 
data needed to be signed is small (only the key set of the zone).  
 
When the new key signing key is generated it is introduced to the zone’s key 
set. The key set is signed with the current KSK and with the new KSK. Thus, in 
the zone file, two signatures coexist so the data can be validated using both the 
old and the new KSKs. 
 
At the same point, the new KSK is sent to the parent zone and a corresponding 
new DS record is created. The parent zone administrator replaces the old DS 
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with the new one. Once the DS record is present on the parent’s all 
authoritative name servers, at least one TTL period of DS record needs to be 
waited before the old KSK can be removed from the child zone. 
 
 
2.3.6 Emergency rollover 
 
The previous section describes normal key rollover routine procedures for the 
zone’s administrator. The case, where keys are compromised or lost and they 
need to be replaced, is called emergency key rollover. 
 
Technically emergency key rollover is the same procedure as the scheduled 
one - old, or in this case compromised, keys need to be removed as soon as 
possible and replaced with the new ones. But here come to play some non-
technical constraints. 
 
If the keys are compromised and removed from the zone file, the name servers 
will know about that only after TTL is expired and they will ask for updates from 
the authoritative name server. If new keys are introduced during this time, the 
name server might not be able to validate the data and the site that was 
requested will be unavailable.  
 
If the administrator decides not to remove compromised keys and proceed with 
the normal rollover procedure, the zone’s data can be spoofed. In practice, a 
user with a validated DNS response could still get a computer virus or be 
redirected to a fake web page and leave their sensitive information. 
 
Having said that, it is up to administrator to decide with what option he/she will 
go after compromising the keys. 
 Zone operators have to make a trade-off if the abuse of the 
compromised key is worse than having data in caches that cannot be 
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compromised key, data in caches signed with this key cannot be 
validated.  However, if the zone administrator chooses to take the path of 
a regular rollover, the malicious key holder can spoof data so that it 
appears to be valid. [6] 
 
When zone signing key is compromised it is enough that zone administrator 
adds the new key as soon as possible. Zone data will be signed with new 
signatures, old key and RRSIGs will be removed and zone will be secured and 
operational.  
 
Suggested steps in case of compromised zone signing key 
 
1. Add new ZSK to key set 
2. Sign the zone with new ZSK 
a. Drop the insecure signatures immediately, which causes that resolvers 
with old compromised ZSK in cache will not be able to verify signatures 
until the old key‘s RRSIG expires. 
b. Leave old signatures in the zone until the old key’s RRSIG has expired, to 
ensure caching resolvers are still able to validate using old key. 
Suggested steps in case of compromised key signing key 
 
With KSK emergency rollover, the zone administrator is facing a choice 
between two options - break the chain of trust or not. The following steps from  
RFC 4641 describe steps required for keeping the chain of trust intact during 
the emergency rollover. 
1. Introduce a new KSK into the key set and keep the compromised KSK in 
the key set. 
2. Sign the key set, with a short validity period.  The validity period should 
expire shortly after the DS is expected to appear in the parent and the old 
DSes have expired from caches. 
32 
 
Turku University of Applied Sciences, Thesis | Ekaterina Andreeva  
 
3. Upload the DS for this new key to the parent. 
4. Follow the procedure of the regular KSK rollover: Wait for the DS to appear 
in the authoritative servers and then wait as long as the TTL of the old DS 
RRs.  If necessary, re-sign the DNSKEY RRSet and modify/extend the 
expiration time 
5. Remove the compromised DNSKEY RR from the zone and re-sign the key 
set using your "normal" validity interval. [6] 
 
However, the administrator might choose another option – the chain of trust will 
be temporarily broken and the zone will appear insecure.  
Method A 
1. Replace the current (compromised) KSK with the new one. 
2. Send the new KSK or corresponding DS to the parent. 
3. Until the parent replaces the DS, the zone will appear as ‘bogus’, hence the 
chain of trust is broken. 
Method B 
1. Immediately have the compromised key’s DS removed from parent. 
2. Zone becomes ‘insecure’. 
 
2.3.7 Key Storage and Security 
 
 
DNSSEC keys created with BIND's default tools are stored locally on the BIND 
server as regular files. This means that potentially anyone with read access to 
server's file system is able to see the contents of the keys. Thus, the best way 
to keep keys is to store them on the non-network connected machines, or even 
on removable drives that can be placed in some safe location. Only an 
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authorized person should be granted with access to that data and use the keys 
only when zone signing is needed. 
 
Depending on the level in the DNS hierarchy, security methods should be 
applied accordingly. The higher in hierarchy key is used, the more wide spread 
the impact is if the key is compromised. The “root” keys are the most sensitive, 
owning those means “owning the Internet” and the security measures to protect 
the private part of the key signing key are impressive. The root key is generated 
in a cryptographic black box which is basically a hardware appliance dedicated 
only to one purpose – to generate highly secure keys for the root zone. The 
appliance itself cannot be operated without proper authorization. There is a 
number of physical “smart cards” – electronic keys size of a credit card – 
divided to group of trusted Internet community representatives. From 14 smart 
card holders, at least five need to be present to unlock the cryptographic 
device. There is another group of trusted representatives called crypto officers 
who do not hold smart cards but instead a physical key to the safe located at 
ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) which holds a 
smart cards and the cryptographic device itself. This is in case of catastrophic 
situation where multiple smart card carriers are not able to get to the facility 
where the safe is located. In addition, the whole process of key generation 
occurs completely off-line. Many organizations do not necessarily have similar 
facilities or resources to secure their keys, but there are many details to learn 
from ICANNs key securing practice. 
 
2.4 DNSSEC Key Exchange 
 
When the key signing key is generated and the key chain is signed, the zone 
administrator should send the public part of the key to the parent. Then the 
parent zone administrators create the hash of that public key and insert it into 
Delegation Signer record in the parent zone and sign it with their own private 
key. This is how the chain of trust is built. 
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2.4.1 Publishing the Public Key 
 
Since there is not a chain of trust yet between the child and the parent, 
delivering the key cannot be authenticated with DNSSEC. Child zone 
administrators should prove their identity and ownership of the zone to parent 
before key can be added. However, in case where same organization is 
administrating the parent domain and subdomains, this process is quite 
straightforward. When a subdomain is created and the administrators decide to 
sign the zone, they generate the zone signing key and the key signing key, then 
after the zone and the key set is signed, they create a DS record pointing to the 
public key signing key and insert it to the delegation section of the parent zone. 
Usually, these steps are manual and could be time-consuming if the 
organization has many subdomains. A good example could be an Internet 
Service Provider (ISP). 
 
If the parent zone is external, proving the child domain’s ownership is required. 
If the parent zone is TLD (Top Level Domain), usually authentication and key 
transfer are done via the registrar where the domain was purchased. This can 
be done, for example, by using the domain registrar’s domain management 
portals. Usually, this is the same place where the domain owner can register 
new domains, see billing information, renew service contracts and so forth. The 
access to the management portal is usually secured with https (Hypertext 
Transfer Protocol Secure) which provides encrypted communication and 
secured authentication); hence, it does not rely on DNSSEC.  
 
Registrars are the “consumer facing interface” of the registries. They handle 
domain name allocations and money transactions when an individual or an 
organization wants to acquire a domain name. Registrars communicate with 
registries which are the actual authorities managing TLDs.  
 A registry is typically responsible for the publication and distribution of 
zone files used by the Domain Name System. [8].  
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Any changes affecting the parent TLD zone the domain administrator does via 
that registrar are communicated to the registry. There exists a standard protocol 
for communication between registrars and registries called Extensible 
Provisioning Protocol (EPP).  
EPP is a connection-oriented protocol that can be layered over multiple 
transport protocols.  Clients establish a secure connection with a server, 
exchange identification, authentication, and option information, and then 
engage in a series of client-initiated command-response exchanges. All 
EPP commands are atomic and idempotent. [7]  
By using this protocol, registrars submit to the registries information about 
created domain(s), changes made to the zone and receive confirmation 
response about performed actions from the registry. In 2005, Scott Hollenbeck 
in RFC 4310 introduced DNS Security Extension for EPP that allows registrars 
to submit DS records to registries to insert those into the parent zone. 
  
2.5 Management systems and tools 
 
Currently there are many tools for DNSSEC management - starting from simple 
command line utilities to software with GUI where routines are automated. 
Modern DNS servers include such tools as a standard option. 
 
The BIND server, one of the most used DNS servers, is shipped with “dnssec-
keygen” and “dnssec-signzone” command line tools that allow zone 
administrators to start working with DNSSEC right after DNS server installing 
and configuring. By using “dnssec-keygen”, it is possible to generate signing 
keys with selected parameters - cryptographic algorithm, key size and so on. 
With “dnssec-signzone”, the actual signing is done - administrator specifies 
name of the zone to be signed and keys generated. In addition, this tool can 
generate DS record and roll over keys using pre-publish scheme. Quite good 
understanding of DNSSEC is required as very little of the DNSSEC 
management is automated when using these tools. For example, key rollover 
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needs to be manually initiated and the zone administrator must remember to 
create new zone keys according to the expiry schedule.  
NSD, Network Service Daemon, is another popular open source DNS server. 
Many people prefer it instead of BIND because of security - NSD is less used 
than BIND and thus less attacked. The DNSSEC tool for NSD called Ldns and 
is almost identical to the “dnssec-keygen” and “dnssec-signzone” tools included 
into BIND.  
 
Another more advanced and easier to use toolset for DNSSEC management is 
OpenDNSSEC. OpenDNSSEC is open source project done in collaboration 
with several organizations such as .SE (Swedish ccTLD authority), Nominet (UK 
ccTLD authority) and NLnet Labs. With OpenDNSSEC, it is possible to 
generate keys and sign the zone, perform automatic key rollover according to 
the policy, generate DS record and upload it to the parent zone. As the code is 
open source with BSD license (Berkeley Source Distribution license, very liberal 
type of software license), OpenDNSSEC software can be included also in 
commercial DNS management solutions.  
OpenDNSSEC is a relatively easy to use command-line application for Unix-
based systems. During the setup process, the administrator needs to import 
zones and policies into the database and once the system is set and started, 
the zones become signed. This is done with few simple commands typed on the 
command line interface. The administrator can set up a schedule for automatic 
rollover. Only manual procedure is generating DS records and uploading those 
to the parent zones. 
 
Many commercial DNS management systems adopted DNSSEC. Software 
giant Microsoft introduced DNSSEC support in Microsoft Server 2008 R2 
release. It is possible to generate keys and sign zones, perform key rollover 
(using pre-published and double signatures methods), create DS record and 
upload it to parent zones. Processes are not fully automated and there is no 
graphical user interface for these tasks but Microsoft administrators can deploy 
DNSSEC in the familiar environment without switching vendors. 
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Lastly, there are commercial DNS and IP management solutions, such as 
NameSurfer Suite by Nixu Software. This software appliance not only supports 
DNSSEC functions and provides automated key rollover, but also offers a 
graphical user interface for management. A similar functionality can be found in 
products of Infoblox, the maker of specialized hardware appliances with 
integrated DNS, DHCP and IP address management. 
 
2.6 Theory Summary 
 
Implementing DNSSEC is straightforward – the zone administrator needs to 
generate keys, sign the zone and include the DS record to the delegation 
section of the parent zone to indicate that the zone is signed. It is also important 
to perform periodical key rollovers to avoid key compromising. There are many 
tools that help to cope with these tasks. However, even advanced ones leave 
one step to be performed manually - uploading DS record to the parent zone. 
 
As it was mentioned in the Section “Publishing Public Key”, the administrator 
needs to copy the generated DS and paste it into the registrar’s or the registry’s 
online portal. After that, the DS record will be included into the parent zone file 
and the zone will become secure. This needs to be repeated every time Key 
Signing Key is renewed.  
 
First of all, a web interface is not often the most convenient method as servers 
used to store the keys are often equipped only with command line interface and 
might lack a web browser all together. When a key is manually moved to a host 
capable of accessing registrar’s online portal, there is a risk that part of the very 
long key will not be copied because of copy/paste error, resulting incorrect data 
in the parent zone file.  
 
The most efficient and safest way would be to automate the DS transfer and 
eliminate the need for admin input altogether. This can be, however, very tricky 
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if not impossible when the interface is designed to be accessed by a user with a 
web browser. The first part of the problem is that there is no direct 
communication channel between the customer managing his own domain and 
the registry authority for the parent zone. All the communication between the 
customer and registry should be done using the registrar as a middleman. This 
brings up the second part of the problem which is that there is no standard way 
of communication between the registrar and the customer. Unlike registries and 
registrars that very often use EPP for intercommunication, each registrar has a 
basically different interface from the customer.  
 
 
2.7 Requirements of KSK / DS exchange mechanism 
 
Depending on registry or registrar, they might expect that the zone 
administrator will send either the DS record or the key signing key. Most of them 
though prefer DS.  
However, there should be the way to authenticate the client who sends such 
sensitive data and the client must be sure that data was sent into the correct 
place.  
 
Once the new key has been generated either manually by the administrator (for 
example, in case of emergency roll over) or scheduled by the management 
system and introduced to the key set, it should be automatically uploaded to the 
parent via API (Application Programming Interface).  
 
According to the double signature rollover method, at this stage there are two 
keys coexisting in the zone file. After new DS has been uploaded to the parent 
zone, the DNS management system can poll it with DNS queries to check when 
the DS record has actually appeared. Once a new key is found, the system 
should wait one TTL, then remove the old key from the key set and resign it 
with the new KSK. The progress of this should be indicated on the user 
interface.  
 
39 
 
Turku University of Applied Sciences, Thesis | Ekaterina Andreeva  
 
The zone administrator should have the possibility to set the key rollover 
interval frequency. There should also be a way to replace the old key 
immediately in case of an emergency rollover. 
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3. Case study of DNSSEC in Finland 
 
In this chapter the actual experiment on implementing the Key Exchange 
Mechanism will be explained and the used software will be introduced. This part 
also contains the overview of Nixu Software products including the DNS 
Management System “NameSurfer Suite”. The existing DNSSEC functionality of 
the NameSurfer Suite is extended with the proposed Proof of Concept for the 
Key Exchange Mechanism. 
 
The Key Exchange Mechanism will be implemented as a Python program in the 
Nixu Software NameSurfer Suite DNS Management System. This program will 
automate uploading of the DS record by fetching generated record from Nixu 
NameSurfer Suite and sending it to the “.fi” zone Authority’s DNS management 
system using Ficora’s web service interface for registrars. 
 
 
3.1 The environment description 
 
For the implementation this Proof of Concept, Nixu Software’s Centralized 
Management System was selected. Nixu NameSurfer Suite provides almost all 
needed automation for DNSSEC routines. The zone administrator can select 
the algorithm, generate the keys and sign the zone using a graphical interface. 
It is possible to perform scheduled Zone Signing Key Rollover automatically. 
But for the initial key exchange and for Key Signing Key rollover there is only 
one option - log in to the registrar's or registry’s portal and copy/paste the DS 
record. Including the key Exchange Mechanism script to the NameSurfer Suite 
will make current DNSSEC functionality in this product even more automated. 
This means that the zone administrator will use a single graphical interface to 
go through all the steps that are needed to secure the zone. However, for the 
proof of concept, the script is ran manually after creating a new key signing key, 
and the UI additions will be implemented at a later phase. 
 
Another part of the POC environment is the Finnish Communications 
Regulation Authority (Ficora), “.fi” domain registry. As it was explained earlier, 
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usually customers do not contact the registry directly, but perform all the 
needed changes to their zones via registrar. The reason for this process is to 
avoid a huge workload and possible disorder if, for example, all the clients who 
registered their zones within “.com” domain would like to submit new data. 
However, in this particular case it was decided to make an exception. Ficora 
holds a relatively small domain space, so it is possible for a customer to contact 
the registry directly, i.e., automatically send the DS record created by DNSSEC 
Management System. 
 
3.2 Nixu NameSurfer Suite and its current DNSSEC 
functionality 
 
Nixu NameSurfer Suite is Nixu Software’s flagship product. It is a virtual 
software appliance for centralized DNS, DHCP and IP Address management.  
 
It consists of four modules - the first one, DNS, allows administrators to create, 
delete and modify zones, manage them; create and delegate subdomains; 
import zones from another name servers. The user interface provides a variety 
of automations, such as using templates when creating new nodes, automatic 
creation of reverse records for corresponding forward records. When creating a 
new zone, the system checks if there is a parent zone already existing and if it 
does, then it automatically adds the child zone to the delegation part of the 
parent. 
 
The second module, IPAM, is used for IP address management. It is an IP 
address database where administrators can manage actual addresses on the 
computers inside the zone.  
 
The third module is used for managing remote servers. Nixu NameSurfer Suite 
is the management overlay, thus, instead of accessing each one of DNS and 
DHCP servers in the network, it can be done in one place. Administrators can 
add delegated zones to remote servers, manage server’s configuration, and 
see statistics such as server workload, queries per second and so on.  
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The last one, User Management, controls access to the modules listed. It is 
possible to create users in the system, add them to the groups and grant them 
specific permissions and access levels.  
 
With the DNSSEC functionality of the Nixu NameSurfer Suite zone, the 
administrator can select the algorithm and generate the keys, sign zone and set 
up automatic Zone Signing Key rollover. This is done via a graphical user 
interface. The system can generate the DS record and the administrator needs 
to copy it and send to the parent. Once the initial keys are generated and key 
rollover is set up, the administrator does not have to resign the zone manually 
again anymore. New records that are added to the zone will be automatically 
signed.  
 
The graphical user interface for generating keys and setting rollover is shown in 
Figures 7 and 8 below. 
 
 
Figure 6. Creating DNSSEC key in NameSurfer Suite 
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Figure 7. Selecting automatic key rollover method and interval in NameSurfer Suite 
However, there is still manual work required - at the moment there is no 
possibility for Key Signing Key automated rollover, only for the Zone Signing 
Key. Since the DS record uploading is still a manual process, KSK rollover is 
required to be done by the zone administrator. This means that the 
administrator needs to create a new Key Signing Key and enable it so that it will 
automatically be added to the key set. However, the old key removal can be 
done only when the new DS record is added to the parent zone. 
 
 
3.3 Proposed functionality of the Key Exchange Mechanism 
 
The Key Exchange Mechanism will have the following functionality: 
 
1. As an input, the script will need the following parameters: zone name, DS 
record, Ficora’s Web Service connection details such as URL, username and 
authentication key. 
2. The script initiates connection to the Ficora’s Web Service. Once the 
connection established, the script sends the DS record to Ficora. 
3. The script starts checking when the new DS record appears in the parent 
zone. To do that, the script should make DNS queries to the parent’s 
authoritative name server(s).  
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4. Once the DS record is published under the delegation section in the parent 
zone, the script should wait at least double the Time-To-Live period before 
the old key signing key can be removed from the zone file.  
5. As the last step, the old key is removed from the zone in NameSurfer Suite 
and the script stops. 
 
Used tools and methods 
 
Nixu NameSurfer Suite API (NSAPI) will be used for communication between 
the script and the NameSurfer Suite. 
 
Nixu NameSurfer Suite Application Programming Interface (NSAPI) 
provides an interface for accessing much of NameSurfer Suite 
functionality such as managing users, groups, keys and views. For 
instance, it could be used for creating a separate front-end for Nixu 
NameSurfer built using the NSAPI.  
The transport mechanism is built on top of XML-RPC, which is a 
lightweight protocol for performing Remote Procedure Calls. 
Authentication and message integrity are achieved by using a shared 
secret- key mechanism. For each procedure call, a separate message 
signature is calculated from the procedure's name, the current time along 
with all of the RPC's argument values. This ensures that an intercepted 
message cannot be modified without access to the secret key. The 
timestamp prevents usage of the same call after a predefined time has 
elapsed. Messages are not encrypted so it is advisable to set up a 
secure connection between the client and server if any sensitive 
information is to be sent over the NSAPI. [12]. 
Ficora (Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority) offers a special Web 
Service interface for the clients. This service provides functionality such as 
registration and renewal of domain names, making changes in the domain 
names without a browser-based interface. This service is available only for 
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registrars, i.e., for the customers of Ficora. Ficora’s Web Service uses 
standardized Web Services Description Language (WSDL).  
WSDL is an XML format for describing network services as a set of 
endpoints operating on messages containing either document-oriented or 
procedure-oriented information [4].  
Documentation for the Web Service can be found in Appendix 4. At the time of 
the thesis writing, it was publicly available at Ficora’s web site 
https://domain.fi/info/attachments/61k1kXiEc/WS_toiminnallisuuspalvelukuvaus
_EN.pdf	  
 
3.4 Development environment 
 
The script is written in then Python language and the development was 
implemented in Mac OS X. Since OS X 10.8 comes with an older version of 
Python, 2.7.2 and the latest production version is 2.7.3, the newer version 
needed to be installed separately. Instead of compiling and manually installing 
our own Python, the latest production version of Python was installed using a 
third party package manager called “Homebrew” 
http://mxcl.github.com/homebrew/. “Homebrew” automates compilation and 
installation of the open source software on Mac. The functionality and usage 
are similar to “yum” manager for Linux Red Hat distributives. For example, in 
case of Python, it leaves the operating system’s own installation of Python 
intact and installs the newer version in a different location. 
 
First, “Homebrew” is installed by running a remote ruby script: 
 
$ /usr/bin/ruby -e "$(/usr/bin/curl -fsSL 
https://raw.github.com/mxcl/homebrew/master/Library/Contributions/install_hom
ebrew.rb)" 
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Then Python 2.7.3 is installed from “Homebrew” using standard installation 
command (“brew install [packagename]”). The recommendation is to install the 
“framework” version so it is selected by giving the parameter “—framework”: 
 
$ brew install python --framework 
 
To ensure that the latest version of Python is used, and not the operating 
system default on the e, following lines were added to shell user’s bash profile 
file. This ensures that the first location where “python” binary is searched from is 
“/usr/local/share/python”: 
 
export PATH=/usr/local/share/python:$PATH 
 
After that, the Python version was verified with the command: 
 
$ python -V 
Python 2.7.3 
 
To easily install Python libraries during the development work, package 
manager PyPI (Python Package Index) was installed. Unlike the default one 
called “easy-install”, PyPI makes installing and uninstalling packages very 
simple.  
 
Installing PyPI using “easy_install” manager: 
 
$ easy_install pip 
 
To further avoid the situation where third party libraries cause issues in the 
development environment, all the development was carried out in the isolated 
virtual environment using “virtualenv” - Virtual Python Environment builder. 
 
To install “virtualenv”: 
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$ pip install virtualenv 
 
To create the actual virtual environment inside the project folder: 
 
$ virtualenv --distribute venv 
 
With the following commands, the environment can be started (inside the 
project folder): 
 
source venv/bin/activate -  the command prompt will change to show the active 
environment. 
 
And stopped: 
 
deactivate - this will restore settings to normal. 
 
3.5 Design of the Python script 
 
Because this script is the Proof of Concept, at this stage it is not implemented in 
the NameSurfer Suite UI. Instead the script is run manually from command line 
and the parameters such as zone name and DS record are given as command 
line arguments. Once the script is moved to the production phase, it will be run 
from NameSurfer’s UI and NameSurfer will automatically pass the required 
parameters to the script.  
 
To make the script reusable once it is integrated as part of the NameSurfer 
Suite, it is divided into classes based on the functionality. Below is the overview 
of the classes. 
 
The whole script with the comments can be found in Appendixes 1, 2 and 3  
 
Class “WSClient” 
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This class is used for communication with Ficora’s Web Service. It provides the 
functionality to create the web service request for adding the DS record and 
sending the request to the web service. 
 
Class “DSChecker” 
This class builds the DNS query to check if the DS record is published in the 
parent zone. 
 
Class “NSClient” 
This class is needed for the last step in the script’s functionality as it provides 
communication to the NameSurfer’s API. It includes the possibility to modify 
(add or remove) resource records in the zone. This class will be used to remove 
the old DS. Once the PoC is implemented as the part of the NameSurfer Suite, 
this class might become irrelevant because after receiving a positive reply 
about uploading the DS record, NameSurfer can perform the necessary action 
by itself. More information about API can be found in Nixu Software NSAPI RPC 
Reference manual [13] 
 
3.6 Implementation of the script 
 
The previous section gave a brief overview of the classes’ functionality. This 
sectionwill provide a more detailed description of the implementation of each of 
them. 
 
3.6.1 Class “WSClient” 
 
As it was mentioned earlier, this class is needed for communication between 
the script and the Web Service of the service provider. For testing purposes, 
Ficora created a special account and the parameters username and 
authentication key were used for authenticating the client when sending the 
request. As described in Section 3.2, Web Service uses WSDL language and to 
communicate with the service this class uses the “suds” Python module. Suds is 
a SOAP Python client which can be used to communicate with Web Services in 
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Python applications. Using the examples from suds documentation placed in 
https://fedorahosted.org/suds/wiki/Documentation. WSDL client was 
implemented with following piece of code: 
 
from suds.client import Client 
self.client = Client(url) 
 
Class WSClient takes the following information as parameters during 
initialization of the class: 
 zone - name of the zone for which the new key signing key was created  
 username - user name for the Ficora’s Web Service user 
 authorizationkey - authentication key provided by Ficora for Web Service user 
authentication 
 url - address of the Ficora’s Web Service 
 
Class has five functions: createAddDSRequest, sendAddDSRequest, 
__createMac, __getTimeStamp, and listDomains. Each function is going to be 
introduced below. 
 
“createAddDSRequest” function 
 
According to Ficora’s Web Service documentation [14], the request for adding 
the DS record is called “AddDSRecord” and the XML format of the request is 
the following: 
<ns2:AddDsRecord> 
       <ns2:request> 
       <ns1:Context> 
<ns1:user_name>iam</ns1:user_name> 
<ns1:mac>68ab2d905d85d9ed14fd3bb4a3c77b2bfe0fade0</ns1:mac> 
<ns1:timestamp>2011-03-03T13:12:00.5005630Z</ns1:timestamp> 
</ns1:Context> 
<ns1:DomainName> </ns1:DomainName> <ns1:AuthorizationKey> 
</ns1:AuthorizationKey> <ns1:DsRecords> 
<ns1:DsRecord> 
<ns1:KeyTag>9866</ns1:KeyTag> 
<ns1:Algorithm>7</ns1:Algorithm> <ns1:DigestType>1</ns1:DigestType> 
<ns1:Digest>d7c9cb1a153681a3d442b4257c2e16aca6f7f11d</ns1:Digest> 
         </ns1:DsRecord> 
       </ns1:DsRecords> 
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     </ns2:request> 
</ns2:AddDsRecord> 
 
To build the described request, fields need to be filled with the required 
parameters. Detailed explanations can be found in Ficora’s Web Service 
documentation Chapter 3.17.3 “Request message” 
[14]. 
To create the request with suds client: 
 
request = self.client.factory.create('ns1:AddDsRecordRequest') 
 
And this is how the AddDsRecordRequest instance looks like in Python: 
  
print request 
(AddDsRecordRequest){ 
   Context =  
      (context){ 
         user_name = None 
         mac = None 
         timestamp = None 
      } 
   DomainName = None 
   AuthorizationKey = None 
   DsRecords =  
      (ArrayOfDsRecord){ 
         DsRecord[] = <empty> 
      } 
 } 
 
Suds has created a corresponding Python object as described in Ficora’s 
WSDL description and now it is just a matter of filling the fields with values. 
Values such as “username”, “AuthorizationKey” and “DomainName” were given 
as parameters during class initialization. The “Timestamp” value was created 
using the function __getTimeStamp - it takes system time, converts it to 
ISO8601 format to match Ficora’s requirement [14]. 
 
The “DsRecords” data field requires an array of DsRecord-objects for input. To 
get an instance of DsRecord object from the Web Service client: 
 
dsrec = self.client.factory.create('ns1:DsRecord') 
 
The DsRecord instance contains the following entries which define the DS 
record: 
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print dsrecord 
(DsRecord){ 
   KeyTag = None 
   Algorithm = None 
   DigestType = None 
   Digest = None 
 } 
 
KeyTag indicates the key type; here it will be the key signing key tag. Algorithm 
shows which cryptographic algorithm was used for the key generation. The DS 
record to be uploaded is given as a parameter to the function 
“createAddDsRequest” and it is parsed into the DsRecord instance’s data fields. 
 
Finally, the “MAC” value is generated from a string where all data fields are 
placed in exactly the same order as they are listed in the message. The 
separate function __createMac was written; this function takes these values, 
adds an authorization key and based on the result string, it generates a hash 
value. This hash value is then added to the message sent to the Web Service. 
 
“sendAddDSRequest” function 
 
After the request is built, it needs to be sent to the Web Service - this is the 
purpose of the “sendAddDSRequest” function. As a parameter, it takes the DS 
record, and passes it to the createAddDSRequest function to get the 
AddDsRecordRequest instance as a return. Then the function sends the 
AddDsRecord request to the web service with: 
client.service.AddDsRecord(r) 
and finally returns WSAddDsRecordResponse: 
 
(WSAddDsRecordResponse){ 
   Code = None 
   TimeStamp = None 
   WebdomainValidationErrors =  
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      (ArrayOferror_message){ 
         error_message[] = <empty> 
      } 
 } 
 
This is an equivalent of “Success” or “Fail” message. The important part is the 
“code” parameter that returns boolean “true” or “false” indicating the result of the 
request sent. “WebdomainValidationErrors” will help with troubleshooting in 
case the request fails. 
 
Functions used for the Web Service testing 
 
There are some functions in the class WSClient that are not essential for the 
script but can be used for testing or other purposes - listDomains, ping and 
sendDomainRegisterRequest. With listDomains, the user can see the list of 
domains registered for him/her in Ficora’s system; ping sends an echo request 
to Web Service to verify that there is connectivity. By using 
sendDomainRegisterRequest, the user can send a request to apply for 
registering a new domain. 
 
3.6.2 Class “DSChecker” 
 
This class includes functions to verify when DS is visible in root name servers.  
When DS record is uploaded, publishing time needs to be verified by 
periodically querying the root servers using checkDS. Finally, after the double 
“Time-to-Live” value of the old DS has expired, it should be removed from the 
parent zone. For polling this information, the function getRRTTL can be applied. 
 
Class takes as initial parameters the zone name, the root (parent) domain and 
optionally the list of the root servers. If rootservers is None, the private function 
__getRootServers (function called private if used only inside the class) will be 
called which resolves the root servers automatically. As a parameter, 
__getRootServers  takes the name of the root domain. 
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“checkDS” function 
 
After the request with the DS record was built and sent to the Ficora’s Web 
Service, its appearance on the root servers should be verified. The “checkDS”  
function uses DNSPython module functions to send DNS queries until it gets a 
reply containing the DS record. This function reads class variable rootservers - 
the list of the root server addresses from where the DS is queried. CheckDS 
returns boolean which is either “True” or “False depending whether the DS 
record is found from the root servers or not. 
 
“getRRTTL” function 
 
A waiting interval equal to two TTL values is needed to make sure that all the 
clients received a new DS record and the chain of trust was not broken. Here 
are used DNSPython’s functions dns.message.make_query to make a query 
and dns.query.udp to send it. As a parameter, getRRTTL takes the list of the 
root servers. The function returns the TTL value as an integer. 
 
3.6.3 Class “NSClient” 
 
This class provides connection to NameSurfer Suite API and has the ability to 
modify resource records in the given zone. Since the API is XML-RPC-based, 
the Python xmlrpclib module is used:  
 
from xmlrpclib import Server, Fault 
 
As an initial parameter, class takes the NameSurfer’s API key and value and 
the address of the server: 
 
def __init__ (self, keyname, transactionkey, serveraddr) : 
   
self.keyname = keyname 
self.transactionkey = transactionkey 
self.serveraddr = serveraddr 
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“__modifyRR”  function 
 
The Required parameters for this private function are the following: the 
operation (“Add” or “Delete”), zone name, node, resource record type, data to 
be modified and optionally RR’s TTL and view where the zone is. All the values 
are hashed with the SHA-256 algorithm and the values and the hash are 
passed to the xmlrpc module’s Server object’s ns.dns.update function: 
 
def __modifyRR(self, operation, zone, node, type, data, ttl="", view="") : 
 procedurename = "ns.dns.update" 
 timestamp = str(int(time.time())) 
 
 hash = hashlib.sha256() 
 hash.update( procedurename \ 
  + "&" + self.keyname \ 
  + "&" + timestamp \ 
  + "&" + operation \ 
  + "&" + zone \ 
  + "&" + view \ 
  + "&" + node \ 
  + "&" + ttl \ 
  + "&" + type \ 
  + "&" + data \ 
  + "&" + self.transactionkey ); 
   
 try: 
  myServer = Server(self.serveraddr) 
      return myServer.ns.dns.update( self.keyname, timestamp, operation, 
zone, \ view, node, ttl, type, data, hash.hexdigest() ) 
        
  except Fault as err: 
      logging.error("Error occured while processing XML-RPC method call: 
%d" % err.faultCode) 
      logging.error("Fault string: %s" % err.faultString) 
       
      return -1 
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The function returns the server’s response or in case of exception logs the 
error. 
 
“addRR” and “delRR” functions 
 
These functions provide a simple wrapper for the private function __modifyRR. 
They can be called and used outside the class NSClient. 
 
3.6.4 “Main” function 
 
The main function initializes the execution of the script. It starts with reading two 
types of the parameters - saved in the configuration file and provided using the 
command line interface. The data stored in the configuration file default.cfg is 
more like application settings and these values are not likely to change between 
the script executions: 
 
[webservice] 
user = Andreeva 
key = xxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
url = 
https://domainws.ficora.fi/fiDomainTest/DomainNameWS_FicoraDomainNameWS.svc?
wsdl 
 
[domain] 
parentdomain = fi. 
parentservers = 
 
[namesurfer] 
keyname = 
transactionkey = 
serveraddr = 
 
The first section defines the parameters required for user authentication against 
Ficora’s Web Interface: user name, authentication key and the address of the 
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service. In the section domain are stored the parent domain name “.fi” and 
parent name server addresses. Finally, in the section namesurfer are placed 
the parameters needed for communicating with the Nixu NameSurfer Suite: API 
key name and value and URL of the NameSurfer’s API. 
 
Values are read by ConfigParser object and stored in the variables: 
 
config = ConfigParser.RawConfigParser() 
 config.read("default.cfg") 
  
username = config.get("webservice","user") 
authorizationkey = config.get("webservice","key") 
url = config.get("webservice","url") 
parentdomain = config.get("domain","parentdomain") 
parentservers = config.get("domain","parentservers") 
if len(parentservers) < 1: 
 parentservers = None 
nsaddress = config.get("namesurfer","serveraddr") 
nskeyname =  config.get("namesurfer", "keyname") 
nskey = config.get("namesurfer","transactionkey") 
 
The user provides another set of parameters taken by the “main” function as 
command line arguments: 
 
python DSUploader.py -h 
usage: DSUploader.py [-h] -z ZONE -k DSKEY [-p POLLFREQ] [-d DELETEKEY] 
 
optional arguments: 
  -h, --help    show this help message and exit 
  -z ZONE       Zone name 
  -k DSKEY      DS key as space delimited text fields 'KEYTAG ALGORITHM 
                DIGESTTYPE DIGEST' 
  -p POLLFREQ   Polling frequency for checking the root for new DS. Default 
                1800 seconds. 
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  -d DELETEKEY  Old key to be deleted from NameSurfer (OPTIONAL). 
 
The Python module argparse brings advanced support of CLI arguments. The 
following values are taken as an input from command line: zone name for which 
the new KSK is introduced, corresponding DS record, polling frequency for 
checking if a new DS appeared on root servers and the old key signing key 
which needs to be removed from the zone after DS was published. The last 
parameter is optional. 
 
First, a new instance of class ArgumentParser() called parser is created. Then 
this instance is configured to parse the required arguments. 
 
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser() 
parser.add_argument("-z", dest="zone", required=True, help = "Zone name") 
parser.add_argument("-k", dest="dskey", required=True, help = "DS key as \ 
 space delimited text fields \'KEYTAG ALGORITHM DIGESTTYPE DIGEST\'") 
 parser.add_argument("-p", dest="pollfreq", default=1800, type=int, help = \ 
 "Polling frequency for checking the root for new DS. Default 1800 seconds.") 
 parser.add_argument("-d", dest="deletekey", help = "Old key to be deleted from 
\ NameSurfer (OPTIONAL).") 
 
Here the parser instance of argparse.ArgumentParser() reads the values 
inputted from the command line. 
  
cli = parser.parse_args() 
zone = cli.zone 
ds = cli.dskey 
pf = cli.pollfreq 
oldkey = cli.deletekey 
 
The next new instance of the class DNSChecker is created and saved with the 
name checker. This instance calls function getRRTTL of the parent class, takes 
the resource record type as a parameter and saves the received TTL value in 
the variable ”ttl”. This will be needed for the later steps. 
 
checker =  DNSChecker(zone, parentdomain, parentservers) 
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ttl = checker.getRRTTL("DS") 
 
After that the “main” function creates the instance ws of the class WSClient to 
connect to Ficora’s Web Service: 
 
ws = WSClient(zone, username, authorizationkey, url) 
 
Then the new DS record is sent to the service: 
 
resp = ws.addDS(ds) 
 
The last step is to verify that the DS record was successfully received by Ficora 
and published in the parent zone. For this, the script is checking the response 
received from the Web Service. In case of boolean  “false”, the function will log 
an error message. Otherwise, a while-loop is started that keeps sending DNS 
queries to the root servers to check the DS record until it is found in the 
response. The checkDS  function of the class DNSChecker will return boolean 
“true” which is the condition of breaking the loop. 
 
if resp.Code == False: 
 logging.error("Error Response: %s" \ 
 %resp.WebdomainValidationErrors.error_message[0].description) 
else : 
 logging.info("DS request sent, polling parent for new DS") 
 while True: 
  if checker.checkDS(ds) is True: break 
  logging.info("DS not found. Checking again after %s seconds" %pf) 
  time.sleep(pf) 
 logging.info("DS found from parent servers.")  
 
If the old key signing key was given as parameter to the script (“-d”, 
“deletekey”), the dellRR function of class NSClient will be used to remove the 
key from the zone in NameSurfer Suite. Here is going to be used variable “ttl” 
that stores old DS’ Time-to-Live value. To make sure that all caching clients 
59 
 
Turku University of Applied Sciences, Thesis | Ekaterina Andreeva  
 
have refreshed the key from the root servers, the zone administrator should 
wait double TTL time and then remove the old key from the zone. This function 
makes this process automated: 
 
if oldkey is not None and len(oldkey)>0: 
 logging.info("Waiting for %s seconds before removing DS from NameSurfer" 
%(ttl*2)) 
 time.sleep(ttl*2) 
 nsc = NSClient(nskeyname, nskey, nsaddress) 
 if nsc.delRR(zone, zone, "DNSKEY", oldkey) is not -1: 
 logging.info("Key \'%s\' removed from NameSurfer" %oldkey)  
 
3.7 Testing 
 
Python, being a scripting-like language, is easy to run and prototype parts of the 
functionality while writing the code. Different command-line interpreters for 
Python such as ipython used in this project can make executing and testing 
parts of the program as easy as copy pasting the code from the editor to the 
shell: 
 
n [22]: string1 = "Hello" 
 
In [23]: string2 = "World!" 
 
In [24]: def printer(s1, s2) : 
   ....:     print s1, s2 
   ....:      
 
In [25]: printer(string1,string2) 
Hello World! 
 
In [26]:  
 
This led to a development/testing method where it was possible to execute very 
specific functions, e.g., sending message to Ficora’s Web Service and 
immediately seeing which kind of response is received. It was the way to start 
working on the parts of the script that were the most challenging without a need 
to even begin designing the classes, methods and so on. 
 
3.7.1 DNS queries 
 
60 
 
Turku University of Applied Sciences, Thesis | Ekaterina Andreeva  
 
Testing the DNS functionalities of the script provided by the class DNSChecker 
was relatively strait forward. It was possible to verify the correct DNS response 
by comparing it with the output of the DNS diagnostic tools such as “dig” or 
“nslookup”. All the DNS testing was made against the public DNS services. 
Functions were run from the iPython shell after importing the DNSChecker class 
there (for example, by copying and pasting the whole class into the iPython’s 
shell window). 
 
Fetching TTL of old DS 
 
This test case is needed to make sure that the function getTTL returns some 
result and that the result is the TTL value of the record given as a parameter. 
When the test was run for the first time, the parameter “DS” (RR name) was 
given as a string.  
 
Class DNSChecker was initialized with following parameters: 
 
dsc = DNSChecker("dnssec.fi","fi.") 
 
The zone selected for the querying is “dnssec.fi” and the parent of this zone is 
“fi.”. The Parent domain’s (fi.) list of servers were omitted from initialization, as it 
was an optional parameter, so a quick check was made that the servers were 
automatically resolved by the __getParentServers function: 
 
In [92]: print dsc.parentservers 
['193.166.4.1', '194.146.106.26', '156.154.100.26', '77.72.229.253', '194.0.1.14', 
'87.239.127.198', '156.154.101.26', '156.154.102.26', '156.154.103.26'] 
 
Before testing the function, the data was queried with the “dig” tool: 
 
$ dig fi. NS 
 
and the answer 
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.... 
;; ADDITIONAL SECTION: 
a.fi.   86350 IN A 193.166.4.1 
.... 
 
Now the query to fi-domain’s nameserver for verifying the correct DS: 
 
$ dig @193.166.4.1 dnssec.fi. DS 
 
;; ANSWER SECTION: 
dnssec.fi.  21600 IN DS 59650 8 1 
DF58C2A099A71F3348462472416743EA7BF5E9A3 
dnssec.fi.  21600 IN DS 59650 8 2 
BD0F7575BB5F3503FABF2CDD3093F02E1DD40E4FF0F859B5A1B47DB3 
14B32893 
 
The TTL value here is “21600” and that is the value which the getRRTTL 
function should return. 
In [83]: print dsc.getRRTTL("DS") 
21600 
 
The value is correct and test is passed -  the function works as intended. 
However, it was noticed that with other nameservers, the function sometimes 
failed and nameservers returned response with “rcode FORMERR”. At first, 
there was not obvious reason but the response indicated that something was 
wrong with the message that was sent, so it was required to troubleshoot the 
issue by looking at the actual DNS message creation in the code. 
 
q = dns.message.make_query(self.zone, rr) 
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Here “rr” is string representation of the record queried, and therein lays the 
problem.The  Message object’s make_query function does in fact expect the 
resource record to be converted in rdata, or, in int format. The 
“Dns.rdatatype.from_text()” function provides the rdata representation so the 
following change was added to make the conversion: 
 
q = dns.message.make_query(self.zone, dns.rdatatype.from_text(rr)) 
 
It is still not fully understood why most of the time queries worked even with 
string representation, but the change made the function more reliable in the 
testing. The same correction was made to the other functions where DNS 
messages were used, e.g., checkDS. 
 
 
Querying new DS record from the parent servers 
 
DS record querying from the parent servers was done with the same instance of 
the class DNSChecker as in the previous example of fetching the TTL. 
 
First  data were obtained with “dig” from the same zone “dnssec.fi”: 
 
$ dig @193.166.4.1 dnssec.fi. DS 
 
;; ANSWER SECTION: 
dnssec.fi.  21600 IN DS 59650 8 1 
DF58C2A099A71F3348462472416743EA7BF5E9A3 
dnssec.fi.  21600 IN DS 59650 8 2 
BD0F7575BB5F3503FABF2CDD3093F02E1DD40E4FF0F859B5A1B47DB3 
14B32893 
 
Then this DS record was used as the parameter for the function checkDS. As it 
is known that these records are the same function, they should return “True”. 
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In [80]: print dsc.checkDS("59650 8 1 
DF58C2A099A71F3348462472416743EA7BF5E9A3") 
True 
 
The returned value is correct and the test is passed – the function works as 
intended. But what is going to happen if the DS records are not matching? To 
verify this, a parameter was given a random value string pretending to be a DS 
record in the dnssec.fi zone. 
 
In [81]: print dsc.checkDS("59650 8 1 
DF58C2A099A71F3348462472416743NOTVALID") 
False 
 
The function returned the value “False” which was expected in this test case. 
 
 
3.7.2 NameSurfer API 
 
The only function of the class NSClient is to delete the specified record from the 
NameSurfer instance. First, a test installation of NameSurfer Suite was 
implemented on the virtual machine. Then there were created a test domain 
“example.com” and the generated NameSurfer API (NSAPI) key. The test zone 
was signed with the zone signing key and key set with the key signing key. 
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Figure 8. Zone "example.com" in NameSurfer Suite 
 
 
Figure 9. Exported zone's master file with key signing key 
Below is placed the code used for deleting DNSKEY resource record: 
 
def __modifyRR(self, operation, zone, node, type, data, ttl="", view="") : 
 procedurename = "ns.dns.update" 
 timestamp = str(int(time.time())) 
 
 hash = hashlib.sha256() 
 hash.update( procedurename \ 
  + "&" + self.keyname \ 
  + "&" + timestamp \ 
  + "&" + operation \ 
  + "&" + zone \ 
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  + "&" + view \ 
  + "&" + node \ 
  + "&" + ttl \ 
  + "&" + type \ 
  + "&" + data \ 
  + "&" + self.transactionkey ); 
   
 try: 
     myServer = Server(self.serveraddr) 
       
     return myServer.ns.dns.update( self.keyname, timestamp, operation, zone, 
view, node, ttl, type, data, hash.hexdigest() ) 
        
 except Fault, v: 
     logging.error("Error occured while processing XML-RPC method call:",v) 
     return -1 
 
Here keyname is the name of the NSAPI key and transactionkey is the key’s 
value used for authentication, serveraddr is the address and the port number of 
the virtual server where NameSurfer Suite is installed. Then there are 
parameters, such as zone name and the node from which RR will be deleted, 
type of the record and its value. TTL and view name are optional and those 
fields were left empty.  
 
After the code of class NSClient was copied to iPython, the following command 
lines were run to initialize the object and to run the deletion function: 
 
nsc = 
NSClient("apitest","wfUseKRzeVn3H6N5HTCPI6Ft0A2R2e5OurMnh0fJlm0=","http://19
2.168.0.6:8057/RPC2") 
 
In [96]: print nsc.delRR("example.com","example.com","DNSKEY","257 3 10 
Av85w29IRnssjhlKNs6YyH4tyzIA9SZjKg98jdToV/x8zWqRRApER0wz6wpwlez0tg5VP/
66 
 
Turku University of Applied Sciences, Thesis | Ekaterina Andreeva  
 
HWm6AD4tQPHFJNBb6007vkGBt/Zxb5HuKkUUnnXFoYuB7Xf3yOufnfvsa4ImigwVc1
L63r2KUsMRpNd/44Bg5JGsOobXb3iqcBMvu+uA0=") 
 
0 
 
According to [3], the response code “0” received after script running means that 
there is no error. Verifying the result by exporting zone’s master file: 
 
The DNSKEY record was removed from the zone and the test was passed.  
 
3.7.3 Web Service client  
 
To be able to test the script against registry’s Web Service, Ficora provided 
access to the test environment with a personal user account and key. 
 
[webservice] 
user = Andreeva 
key =  xxxxxxxx 
url = https://domainws.ficora.fi/fiDomainTest/DomainName.svc?wsdl 
 
This test service has almost the same functionality as the production one 
except that additions and changes are not saved or propagated to the real 
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system. Registered Ficora clients can access this service free of charge. 
Testing was started by using some of the simple Web Service functions. 
 
Testing basic Web Service functions 
 
The first step to try could be pinging the Web Service; this can be done even 
without user authentication.  
The Ping service is an interface with no message to be sent, and returns 
a simple response. Developers can use this service to test that the 
connection to the test/production server functions without generating 
messages and calculating a MAC code [14] 
 
Initialization of the class WSClient: 
 
wsc=WSClient("dnssec.fi", "Andreeva", "xxxxxxxxxxxx", 
"https://domainws.ficora.fi/fiDomainTest/DomainNamexxxxxxx.svc?wsdl") 
 
Using the ping function of this class: 
 
In [3]: print wsc.ping(5) 
5 
 
The Ping function returned “5” as it was expected, so the test is passed. 
 
Another functionality that is easy to test was listing the user’s domains.  
The Renew Domain Name service can be used to retrieve a list of 
domain names available for renewal. The service returns a list of the 
domain names in control of the ISP (i.e., the ISP holds their authorization 
key or ISP has control over domain name through name server) and are 
expiring within x days. [14] 
 
This request already requires a MAC to be calculated, so the listDomains 
function gives a possibility to properly test user authentication. 
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As the service’s name suggest, by default it does not return all the user’s 
domains but only those that will expire within N amount of days. But by setting 
the N number high enough, for example 10 000, will in practice get the full list. 
 
After initializing the class as in the previous test case, the printing domain list: 
 
In [8]: wsc.listDomains() 
Out[8]:  
(renewable_domains_response){ 
   domains = None 
   validation_errors = None 
   code = True 
 } 
 
As it can be seen from the example above, the response code is correct and 
there are no errors with MAC or authentication. This confirms that the function 
__createMac works correctly. The value “None” for the variable domains means 
that this Web Service user “Andreeva” has no domains. The test is passed and 
the function works as intended. 
 
Registering domain 
 
As the previous example showed, the first speed bump occurred - test user 
“Andreeva” does not have any domains. To resolve this issue, there seemed to 
be two options: register a new domain for this user with the Web Service 
function registerDomain, or ask Ficora’s support to create a test domain for user 
“Andreeva”.  
 
Registering domain with the registerDomain function 
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While the domain registration was not in the scope of the script, the function 
createRegisterDomainRequest was created under the class WSClient just to 
tackle the issue with the test domain.  
 
def createRegisterDomainRequest(self) : 
  """ 
  Domain registration function for debugging purpose 
  """   
  contactInfo = ["Katja Co", "Katja","Andreeva","Streetname 1"\ 
      ,"00200","Helsinki","123456789" \ 
      ,"katja@katja","fi-FI","Department","FI"] 
   
  request = self.client.factory.create('ns1:apply_request') 
   
  request.name = self.zone 
  request.valid_applicant_confirmation = "true" 
  request.based_on_person_name = "false" 
  request.person_name_registration_id = "0" 
  request.person_name_registration_number = "0" 
  request.domain_name_holder_company_type = "1" 
  request.domain_name_holder_business_id ="12345671" 
  request.domain_name_holder_person_id ="0" 
  request.electronic_notification_approval = "true" 
  request.data_publishing_approval = "false" 
   
  nameserver = self.client.factory.create('ns1:nameserver') 
  request.domain_name_holder_domicile_in_finland = "true" 
   
  nameserver.name = "ns1.katja" 
  nameserver.ipaddress = "1.1.1.1" 
  request.nameservers.nameserver.append(nameserver) 
   
  request.domain_validity_period_in_months = "36" 
   
  contact = self.client.factory.create('ns1:contact') 
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  contact.type.set("0") 
  contact.company = contactInfo[0] 
  contact.first_names.string.append(contactInfo[1]) 
  contact.last_name = contactInfo[2] 
  contact.postal_address = contactInfo[3] 
  contact.postal_code = contactInfo[4] 
  contact.postal_office = contactInfo[5] 
  contact.phone = contactInfo[6] 
  contact.email = contactInfo[7] 
  contact.language_code = contactInfo[8] 
  contact.department = contactInfo[9] 
  contact.country = contactInfo[10] 
  contact.ContactId = "0" 
   
  request.contacts.contact.append(contact) 
   
  request.context.user_name = self.username 
   
  request.context.timestamp = self.__getTimeStamp() 
   
  hashvals = request.name \ 
     +request.valid_applicant_confirmation \ 
     +request.based_on_person_name \ 
     +request.person_name_registration_id \ 
     +request.person_name_registration_id \ 
     +request.domain_name_holder_company_type \ 
     +request.domain_name_holder_business_id \ 
     +request.electronic_notification_approval \ 
     +request.data_publishing_approval \ 
     +nameserver.name \ 
     +nameserver.ipaddress \ 
     +contact.type.get() \ 
     +''.join(contactInfo) \ 
     +contact.ContactId \ 
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     +self.username \ 
     +request.context.timestamp \ 
     +request.domain_validity_period_in_months \ 
    
 +request.domain_name_holder_domicile_in_finland 
   
  mac = self.__createMac(hashvals) 
  request.context.mac = mac 
   
  return request 
 
As it seen from the example below, this function requires a lot of additional 
information such as organization name and contact information that is not 
needed for sending a DS record. 
 
In [12]: regdomainrequest = c.factory.create('ns1:apply_request') 
 
In [13]: print regdomainrequest 
(apply_request){ 
   name = None 
   valid_applicant_confirmation = None 
   based_on_person_name = None 
   person_name_registration_id = None 
   person_name_registration_number = None 
   domain_name_holder_company_type = None 
   domain_name_holder_business_id = None 
   domain_name_holder_person_id = None 
   electronic_notification_approval = None 
   data_publishing_approval = None 
   nameservers =  
      (ArrayOfnameserver){ 
         nameserver[] = <empty> 
      } 
   contacts =  
      (ArrayOfcontact){ 
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         contact[] = <empty> 
      } 
   context =  
      (context){ 
         user_name = None 
         mac = None 
         timestamp = None 
      } 
   domain_validity_period_in_months = None 
   domain_name_holder_domicile_in_finland = None 
 } 
 
For this reason it was decided to “hard-code” the required parameters into the 
function.  
 
 Ficora’s Web Service documentation section 3.3.2 describes how to calculate a 
MAC for createRegisterDomainRequest request [14]. Those values were stored 
in the variable hashvals and passed to the __createMac function. 
Below is the request created by the function and ready to be sent to the Web 
Service: 
 
IIn [36]: wsc.createRegisterDomainRequest() 
Out[36]:  
(apply_request){ 
   name = "dnssec.fi" 
   valid_applicant_confirmation = True 
   based_on_person_name = False 
   person_name_registration_id = "0" 
   person_name_registration_number = "0" 
   domain_name_holder_company_type = "0" 
   domain_name_holder_business_id = None 
   domain_name_holder_person_id = "0110810013" 
   electronic_notification_approval = True 
   data_publishing_approval = "false" 
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   nameservers =  
      (ArrayOfnameserver){ 
         nameserver[] =  
            (nameserver){ 
               name = "ns1.katja" 
               ipaddress = "1.1.1.1" 
               ipv6address = None 
            }, 
      } 
   contacts =  
      (ArrayOfcontact){ 
         contact[] =  
            (contact){ 
               type =  
                  (contact_type){ 
                     value = "0" 
                  } 
               company = "Katja Co" 
               first_names =  
                  (ArrayOfstring){ 
                     string[] =  
                        "Katja", 
                  } 
               last_name = "Andreeva" 
               postal_address = "Streetname 1" 
               postal_code = "00200" 
               postal_office = "Helsinki" 
               phone = "123456789" 
               email = "katja@katja" 
               language_code = "fi-FI" 
               department = "Department" 
               organizationid = None 
               country = "FI" 
               ContactId = None 
            }, 
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      } 
   context =  
      (context){ 
         user_name = "Andreeva" 
         mac = "0a6e5d3becaef1b3414bfd8cccba3cc1b00ba55a" 
         timestamp = "2012-12-06T14:25:22.4600000Z" 
      } 
   domain_validity_period_in_months = 36 
   domain_name_holder_domicile_in_finland = "true" 
 } 
 
 
Then this request was sent to the Web Service with the function 
sendDomainRequestregister and the following response was received: 
 
In [37]: wsc.sendDomainRegisterRequest() 
Out[37]:  
(apply_response){ 
   code = False 
   timestamp = 2012-12-06 16:25:14.218857 
   webdomain_validation_errors =  
      (ArrayOferror_message){ 
         error_message[] =  
            (error_message){ 
               description = "Current user can not be autheticated by the system" 
               code = "AUTHENTICATION_FAILED" 
            }, 
      } 
   contact_validation_errors = None 
   nameserver_validation_errors = None 
   nameserver_technical_errors = None 
 } 
 
According to the error message, it seems that the user’s authentication failed, 
which would mean in turn that the MAC value sent was not valid. But after 
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double-checking with Ficora’s specification in  Section 3.3.2 of the 
documentation [14] it did not reveal any mistakes in the code. There is a chance 
that some fields require either specifically empty string or a null value but that is 
not clarified in the documentation. In addition, it is not obvious in which cases 
numeric values should be of type “int” or just a string. Regardless of the domain 
registration problem, the logic of thr MAC calculation in the script has been 
proven to be valid when tested with the listDomain function.  
 
Troubleshooting domain creation with Ficora 
 
After a few failed attempts to create a test domain under user account 
“Andreeva” using the web service API, an email explaing the situation was sent 
to Ficora and any possible assistance with message syntax troubleshooting 
was requested. It was suggested that Ficora could either check if the message 
and mac sent was correctly formatted or if Ficora could manually create a test 
domain under the account “Andreeva” to avoid whole domain creation 
troubleshooting. However, the reply from Ficora stated there were some 
challenges at the moment creating new domains in test system, and 
unfortunately the test web service interface does not work 1:1 as the production 
one. Ficora provided a testing tool called macman to help validation of the web 
service request message, but the Windows application did not run properly and 
could not be used for validation at the time of testing.  
 
According to Web Service Testing [19], another big difference between test and 
production environment is that  
It functions identically to the actual production version, but the changes 
and additions are not updated. [19] 
The quoted description makes it sound like the test environment is “read”-only. 
Any changes made in it will not be recorded and taken into use. Thus, even if 
the registration would work and web service returned “True”, if the domain does 
not actually get created there will not be a domain to test DS uploading. 
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Further input from the usage of macman tool is still been expected from Ficora 
in addition to a clarification if the web service is actually writable or read-only. 
However, since the time for this project was running out, it was decided to 
proceed with other parts of the script development. 
 
Uploading DS records 
 
DS upload testing was understandably quite crippled, as there was not a test 
domain available for uploading in Ficora’s system.  Nevertheless, it was 
possible to test that the upload message was created correctly and that no 
unexpected errors were received from the web service. 
 
In the ipython prompt, the the DS upload message was created with the 
following DS key parameter: 
 
In [2]: wsc = 
WSClient("dnssec.fi","Andreeva","xxxxxxxxx","https://domainws.ficora.fi/fiDomainTest/
DomainNameWS_FicoraDomainNameWS.svc?wsdl") 
 
 
In [3]: req = wsc.createAddDSRequest("60273 10 2 
6d2489c4d3539b3eab512166be7d495befe5389fa8581b786de5c042d2ffed23") 
 
In [4]: print req 
(AddDsRecordRequest){ 
   Context =  
      (context){ 
         user_name = "Andreeva" 
         mac = "b8fb262ec39623bebf0195f57a04e2a651fd7a16" 
         timestamp = "2012-12-06T22:43:26.8200000Z" 
      } 
   DomainName = "dnssec.fi" 
   AuthorizationKey = " xxxxxxxxx " 
   DsRecords =  
      (ArrayOfDsRecord){ 
         DsRecord[] =  
            (DsRecord){ 
               KeyTag = "60273" 
               Algorithm = "10" 
               DigestType = "2" 
               Digest = 
"6d2489c4d3539b3eab512166be7d495befe5389fa8581b786de5c042d2ffed23" 
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            }, 
      } 
 } 
 
The response message from web service where there, of course, was not the 
test domain “dnssec.fi” was the following: 
 
(WSAddDsRecordResponse){ 
   Code = False 
   TimeStamp = 2012-12-07 00:44:06.818873 
   WebdomainValidationErrors =  
      (ArrayOferror_message){ 
         error_message[] =  
            (error_message){ 
               description = "Current user can not be autheticated by the system" 
               code = "AUTHENTICATION_FAILED" 
            }, 
      } 
 } 
 
The fact that the error was again authentication-related was somehow 
confusing, but it could be a generic error message when there is no matching 
data at the web service’s end. 
 
3.7.5 Testing the final script 
 
For the final script testing, some changes were needed to be made since there 
is no test domain where to upload the DS key. 
 
From the script’s main function: 
 
#Checking if DS key was uploaded successfully 
 #if resp.Code == False: 
 if True == False: 
 
With this code the web service’s response for DS uploading is set to be always 
true and this gives possibility to finalize the testing. For simulating the existence 
of test domain, “dnssec.fi” was created in NameSurfer Suite and signed with 
ZSK and KSK. In addition, a new KSK was introduced to zone. The old key 
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signing key will be given as parameter to the script to be removed from the 
zone after the new DS is published. As the DS record could not be uploaded to 
the actual fi-root, an already published DS was obtained with the  “dig” utility 
from the “real” “dnssec.fi” zone. After DS had uploaded when the script starts 
checking when the DS is published in the parent domain, it should see it 
immediately. 
 
Parameters given to the script from command-line: 
 
$python DSUploader.py -z dnssec.fi -k "59650 8 1 
DF58C2A099A71F3348462472416743EA7BF5E9A3" -p 5 -d "257 3 10 
Av858BIMmUbrwKQfS0j0DAcwWuwbg3+1N70BpC6Cpd8O/2A1rw97/sNfC6WR1QFd
VIBWx304wHdOXH1Q04YxBBi109b6uDkBFCIAxA/nLh6p05iiJi4CdEp/rE/iREWy9XRD
iUtdzOJs1Jn75o078wXYASviSAwfm/oM0LHwX7Uosh8=" 
 
Entries from the script’s log during script execution: 
 
INFO:root:DS request sent, polling parent for new DS 
INFO:root:DS found from parent servers. 
INFO:root:Waiting for 43200 seconds before removing DS from NameSurfer 
 
Because the DS given to the script is exactly the same as the one in the zone 
“dnssec.fi”, the script immediately found it from the parent servers and began to 
wait double the DS record’s TTL (2*21600 seconds) until it removed the old key 
signing key from NameSurfer. 
 
INFO:root:Key 257 3 10 
Av858BIMmUbrwKQfS0j0DAcwWuwbg3+1N70BpC6Cpd8O/2A1rw97/sNfC6W
R1QFdVIBWx304wHdOXH1Q04YxBBi109b6uDkBFCIAxA/nLh6p05iiJi4CdEp/r
E/iREWy9XRDiUtdzOJs1Jn75o078wXYASviSAwfm/oM0LHwX7Uosh8= 
removed from NameSurfer 
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The script was executed successfully without any error or warnings given. This 
means that test is passed and the code works as expected (except minor 
issues related to domain existence in the Ficora system). 
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4. Conclusion 
 
As increasingly critical services start to operate on the Internet and data 
becomes more sensitive, cyber criminals are motivated to abuse the 
vulnerabilities and weaknesses in the infrastructure raises. In the pre-DNSSEC 
world, there was no way to verify the authenticity of DNS responses. The 
figurative “phone-book” of the Internet was and still partly remains vulnerable to 
spoofing and “man-in-the-middle” attacks. DNS, being  a so fundamental and 
essential part of the Internet infrastructure solution to securing it, cannotcome 
soon enough. 
 
Validation in DNSSEC is based on the “chain of trust”. An authority higher in 
hierarchy can always validate a lower one. But without a functioning key 
exchange implementing this “chain of trust” and DNSSEC itself is cumbersome. 
Agreeing on the standard methods and best practices of the key exchange and 
then DNS management tools implementing those is still work in progress. 
Although DNSSEC needs to be implemented starting from top to bottom in DNS 
hierarchy, there is already a need to think about the key exchange not only 
between registrars and registries, top level domains and second level domains, 
but also between any parent and child zone. This requires that DNS 
management tools universally implement standardized key exchange 
mechanisms. 
 
This project was an attempt to bring the key exchange automation to Name 
Surfer Suite for zones with “.fi” parent following the best practices introduced in 
the theory part of this thesis, specifically in section “2.4 DNSSEC Key 
Exchange”. Automation was implemented as described in Section “3.3 
Proposed functionality of the Key Exchange Mechanism”. The existing Ficora’s 
Web Service API was utilized in combination with DNSPython. Integration to 
NameSurfer was accomplished using its public API. The result of this work is 
the DSUploader – (Appendix 3) and its supporting libraries (Appendix 1 and 
Appendix 2).  
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Based on the results of the script testing phase, presented in Section “3.7 
Testing”, further troubleshooting needs to be done in the web service test 
environment. Lack of the test data in the web service test environment prevents 
key upload testing so the script cannot be properly verified yet. However, the 
groundwork with the Web Service’s API implementation in Python is completed. 
Once the technical issues with the testing environment have been resolved and 
script’s key upload functionality is fully verified, the project can move to the next 
phase where the DSUploader script’s Python classes are used to integrate the 
key exchange mechanism within the NameSurfer Suite itself. 
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Appendix 1 “FicoraWS.py” code 
 
from suds.client import Client 
import time, xml.utils.iso8601, hashlib, logging 
 
class WSClient: 
 
 def __init__(self, zone, username, authorizationkey, url) : 
  self.username = username 
  self.authorizationkey = authorizationkey 
  self.url = url 
  self.zone = zone 
  try: 
   self.client = Client(url) 
  except: 
   logging.error("Failed to connect to host %s" 
%self.url) 
 
 #Create webservice request for adding new DS key to root 
 def createAddDSRequest(self, dsr) : 
  """ 
  Create new DsRequest 
  @param dsr: DS key 
  @type dsr: string 
  @return: DsRequest object 
  """  
  dsrec = self.client.factory.create('ns1:DsRecord') 
  ds = dsr.split(" ") 
 
  dsrec.KeyTag = ds[0] 
  dsrec.Algorithm = ds[1] 
  dsrec.DigestType = ds[2] 
  dsrec.Digest = ds[3] 
 
  request = 
self.client.factory.create('ns1:AddDsRecordRequest') 
  request.Context.user_name = self.username 
  request.AuthorizationKey = self.authorizationkey 
  request.DomainName = self.zone 
 
  request.DsRecords.DsRecord.append(dsrec) 
 
  request.Context.timestamp = self.__getTimeStamp() 
 
  hashvals = 
''.join([self.username,request.Context.timestamp,self.zone, \ 
   ds[0],ds[1],ds[2],ds[3]]) 
  request.Context.mac = self.__createMac(hashvals) 
   
  return request 
 
 #Create MAC authentication value using the values 
 def __createMac(self, vals) : 
  m = hashlib.sha1() 
  vals = vals+self.authorizationkey 
  vals.encode('utf-8') 
  m.update(vals) 
  return m.hexdigest() 
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 def __getTimeStamp(self) : 
  ts = xml.utils.iso8601.tostring(time.time()) 
  ts = ts[:22]+"00000"+ts[22:] 
  return ts 
 
 #Send the request to webservice 
 def addDS(self, ds) : 
  """ 
  Sends an AddDsRecordRequest to web service 
  @param r: An AddDsRecordRequest 
  @type r: suds.sudsobject.AddDsRecordRequest 
  @return: WSAddDsRecordResponse 
  """ 
  r = self.createAddDSRequest(ds) 
  return self.client.service.AddDsRecord(r) 
   
 def listDomains(self) : 
   
  request = 
self.client.factory.create('ns1:renewable_domains_request') 
  request.DaysToExpiration = "10000" 
   
  request.context.user_name = self.username 
   
  request.context.timestamp = self.__getTimeStamp() 
  hashvals = '10000'+self.username+request.context.timestamp 
  mac = self.__createMac(hashvals) 
  request.context.mac =  mac 
   
  return self.client.service.RenewableDomains(request) 
   
 def ping(self, i) : 
  return self.client.service.Ping(i) 
   
 def createRegisterDomainRequest(self) : 
  """ 
  Domain registration function for debugging purpose 
  """   
  contactInfo = ["Katja Co", "Department", 
"Katja","Andreeva","Streetname 1"\ 
      ,"00200","Helsinki","123456789" \ 
      ,"katja@katja","fi-FI","FI"] 
   
  request = self.client.factory.create('ns1:apply_request') 
   
  request.name = self.zone 
  request.valid_applicant_confirmation = True 
  request.based_on_person_name = False 
  request.person_name_registration_id = "0" 
  request.person_name_registration_number = "0" 
  request.domain_name_holder_company_type = "0" 
  #request.domain_name_holder_business_id ="12345671" 
  request.domain_name_holder_person_id ="0110810013" 
  request.electronic_notification_approval = True 
  request.data_publishing_approval = "false" 
   
  nameserver = self.client.factory.create('ns1:nameserver') 
  request.domain_name_holder_domicile_in_finland = "true" 
   
  nameserver.name = "ns1.katja" 
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  nameserver.ipaddress = "1.1.1.1" 
  request.nameservers.nameserver.append(nameserver) 
   
  request.domain_validity_period_in_months = 36 
   
  contact = self.client.factory.create('ns1:contact') 
   
  contact.type.set("0") 
  contact.company = contactInfo[0] 
  contact.department = contactInfo[1] 
  contact.first_names.string.append(contactInfo[2]) 
  contact.last_name = contactInfo[3] 
  contact.postal_address = contactInfo[4] 
  contact.postal_code = contactInfo[5] 
  contact.postal_office = contactInfo[6] 
  contact.phone = contactInfo[7] 
  contact.email = contactInfo[8] 
  contact.language_code = contactInfo[9] 
  contact.country = contactInfo[10] 
  #contact.ContactId = "0" 
   
  request.contacts.contact.append(contact) 
   
  request.context.user_name = self.username 
   
  request.context.timestamp = self.__getTimeStamp() 
   
  hashvals = request.name \ 
    
 +str(request.valid_applicant_confirmation) \ 
     +str(request.based_on_person_name) \ 
     +request.person_name_registration_id \ 
     +request.person_name_registration_number 
\ 
     +request.domain_name_holder_company_type 
\ 
     +request.domain_name_holder_person_id \ 
    
 +str(request.electronic_notification_approval) \ 
     +request.data_publishing_approval \ 
     +nameserver.name \ 
     +nameserver.ipaddress \ 
     +contact.type.get() \ 
     +''.join(contactInfo) \ 
     +self.username \ 
     +request.context.timestamp \ 
    
 +str(request.domain_validity_period_in_months) 
        
  mac = self.__createMac(hashvals) 
  request.context.mac = mac 
   
  return request 
   
 def sendDomainRegisterRequest(self): 
  r = self.createRegisterDomainRequest() 
  return self.client.service.Apply(r) 
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Appendix 2. “NSAPI.py” code. 
 
from xmlrpclib import Server, Fault 
import hashlib, logging 
import time 
 
class NSClient: 
  
 def __init__ (self, keyname, transactionkey, serveraddr) : 
   
  self.keyname = keyname 
  self.transactionkey = transactionkey 
  self.serveraddr = serveraddr 
   
 def __modifyRR(self, operation, zone, node, type, data, ttl="", 
view="") : 
  procedurename = "ns.dns.update" 
  timestamp = str(int(time.time())) 
 
  hash = hashlib.sha256() 
  hash.update( procedurename \ 
   + "&" + self.keyname \ 
   + "&" + timestamp \ 
   + "&" + operation \ 
   + "&" + zone \ 
   + "&" + view \ 
   + "&" + node \ 
   + "&" + ttl \ 
   + "&" + type \ 
   + "&" + data \ 
   + "&" + self.transactionkey ); 
   
  try: 
      myServer = Server(self.serveraddr) 
       
      return myServer.ns.dns.update( self.keyname, 
timestamp, operation, zone, \ 
       view, node, ttl, type, data, hash.hexdigest() ) 
        
  except Fault as err: 
      logging.error("Error occured while processing XML-RPC 
method call: %d" % err.faultCode) 
      logging.error("Fault string: %s" % err.faultString) 
       
      return -1 
       
 def addRR(self, zone, node, type, data, ttl="", view="") : 
  return self.__modifyRR("ADD",zone,node,type,data,ttl,view) 
   
 def delRR(self, zone, node, type, data, ttl="", view="") : 
  return self.__modifyRR("DELETE", zone, node, type, data, 
ttl, view) 
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Appendix 3. “DSUploader.py” code 
 
import sys, time, dns, dns.query, dns.resolver, ConfigParser, 
argparse, logging 
from FicoraWS import WSClient 
from NSAPI import NSClient 
   
class DNSChecker : 
  
 def __init__(self, zone, parentdomain, parentservers=None) : 
  self.zone = zone 
  self.parentdomain = parentdomain 
  self.parentservers = parentservers 
   
  if not self.parentservers: 
   self.parentservers = 
self.__getParentServers(self.parentdomain) 
  else: 
   self.parentservers = parentservers.split(",") 
  
 #Method to resolve parentdomain's nameservers in case those are 
not provided in cfg file  
 def __getParentServers(self, domain) : 
  parentservers = [] 
  answer = dns.resolver.query(domain,dns.rdatatype.NS) 
  for i in answer.response.additional: 
   if i.rdtype == 1: 
    parentservers.append(i.items[0].to_text()) 
  return parentservers 
  
 #Query master for existence of new DS 
 def checkDS(self, ds) : 
  found = False 
  q = dns.message.make_query(self.zone, dns.rdatatype.DS) 
  for server in self.parentservers: 
   if found == True: break 
   response = dns.query.udp(q,server,30) 
   for set in response.answer: 
      for dsr in set: 
        if dsr.to_text().lower() == ds.lower(): 
         found = True 
         break 
     return found 
      
 def getRRTTL(self, rr) : 
  q = dns.message.make_query(self.zone, 
dns.rdatatype.from_text(rr)) 
  ttl = None 
  for server in self.parentservers: 
   response = dns.query.udp(q,server,30) 
   for set in response.answer: 
    ttl = set.ttl 
   if ttl is None: 
    for set in response.additional: 
     ttl = set.ttl 
   if ttl is not None: break 
     return ttl 
 
def main(): 
89 
 
Turku University of Applied Sciences, Thesis | Ekaterina Andreeva  
 
  
 #Enabling logging 
 logging.basicConfig(filename="DSUploader.log", 
level=logging.INFO) 
  
 #Reading more or less static parameters from config-file  
 config = ConfigParser.RawConfigParser() 
 config.read("default.cfg") 
  
 username = config.get("webservice","user") 
 authorizationkey = config.get("webservice","key") 
 url = config.get("webservice","url") 
 parentdomain = config.get("domain","parent") 
 parentservers = config.get("domain","parentservers") 
 if len(parentservers) < 1: 
  parentservers = None 
 nsaddress = config.get("namesurfer","serveraddr") 
 nskeyname =  config.get("namesurfer", "keyname") 
 nskey = config.get("namesurfer","transactionkey") 
  
 #More often changing parameters such as zone and key  
 #are read from command-line arguments: 
 parser = argparse.ArgumentParser() 
 parser.add_argument("-z", dest="zone", required=True, help = 
"Zone name") 
 parser.add_argument("-k", dest="dskey", required=True, help = 
"DS key as \ 
  space delimited text fields \'KEYTAG ALGORITHM DIGESTTYPE 
DIGEST\'") 
 parser.add_argument("-p", dest="pollfreq", default=1800, 
type=int, help = \ 
  "Polling frequency for checking the root for new DS. 
Default 1800 seconds.") 
 parser.add_argument("-d", dest="deletekey", help = "Old key to 
be deleted from \ 
  NameSurfer (OPTIONAL).") 
  
 cli = parser.parse_args() 
 zone = cli.zone 
 ds = cli.dskey 
 pf = cli.pollfreq 
 oldkey = cli.deletekey 
   
 #First get the current DS keys TTL - this will be needed later 
 checker = DNSChecker(zone, parentdomain, parentservers) 
 ttl = checker.getRRTTL("DS") 
 #Creating new webservice client object 
 ws = WSClient(zone, username, authorizationkey, url) 
 #Sending the new DS key to webservice 
 resp = ws.addDS(ds) 
 #Checking if DS key was uploaded successfully 
 if resp.Code == False: 
  logging.error("Error Response: %s" \ 
  
 %resp.WebdomainValidationErrors.error_message[0].description) 
 else : 
  logging.info("DS request sent, polling parent for new DS") 
  while True: 
   if checker.checkDS(ds) is True: break 
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   logging.info("DS not found. Checking again after %s 
seconds" %pf) 
   time.sleep(pf) 
  logging.info("DS found from parent servers.")  
  #here comes nasu script to delete old DS 
  if oldkey is not None and len(oldkey)>0: 
   logging.info("Waiting for %s seconds before removing 
DS from NameSurfer" %(ttl*2)) 
   time.sleep(ttl*2) 
   nsc = NSClient(nskeyname, nskey, nsaddress) 
   if nsc.delRR(zone, zone, "DNSKEY", oldkey) is not -
1: 
    logging.info("Key \'%s\' removed from 
NameSurfer" %oldkey)  
 
if __name__ == "__main__": 
 main() 
 
